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APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES
George W. Angerstein*

N STATEMENTS of the theory and purpose, as well as
in definitions of workmen's compensation, reference frequently has been made to the matter of litigation. Beyond
question, one of the fundamental purposes of workmen's compensation, including that which underlies the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Illinois, was to devise a method of
providing prompt benefits according to a fixed schedule with
as little litigation as possible. Recognition of that purpose
was given quite early in Illinois when the Supreme Court of
this state declared ". . . the tendency . . . in following
out the spirit of the act has been to permit the hearing
and adjudication of claims with as little delay and formality
as is consistent with orderly procedure."'
Again, when
upholding the compulsory application of the statute as provided in the 1917 amendment,2 the court said: "The theory
and purpose of workmen's compensation acts are to provide
speedy and equitable relief in case of injury to those exposed
to the peculiar hazards of certain businesses and enterprises
generally known to be hazardous. .. ." In still another case,
the court has indicated that the purpose of the law was to
* Member, Illinois bar; L1.B., Northwestern University; author of "The Employer
and the Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois," (Hawkins & Loomis, Chicago,
1923).
1 Oriental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 539 at 544, 127 N. E.
676 at 677 (1920).
2 Laws 1917, p. 507, § 3. As subsequently modified, such provision appears in
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 139.
3 Illinois Publishing & Printing Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 299 Ill. 189 at 196, 132
N. E. 511 at 514 (1921).
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avoid litigation insofar as possible4 and, bearing on questions of promptness and expense, it has pointed out that a
prime object of such statutes was the allowance of compensation for accidental injuries to employees as promptly and
as cheaply as may be.' From these few of the numerous
available references,6 it would seem that a belief existed on
the part of the original framers of the act that there would
be but little litigation between employers and employees
based upon accidental injuries sustained by the latter during
the course of employment.
Clearly indicative of the truth of the time-honored adage
as to the difference which exists between theory and practice,
however, is the great mass of litigation which has developed
under workmen's compensation acts whether before the
administering tribunals or in the reviewing courts. It was
anticipated that the Industrial Commission, created by and
charged with the duty of administering the law, would undoubtedly have to determine many disputed cases but the
volume of work imposed on it as well as upon certain of the
courts, particularly upon the Supreme Court, was unforeseen
as well as unexpected and has been greater than is generally
realized. Much might be said as to ways and means of materially lessening such burden, but such is not the purpose of
this article. It deals solely with certain matters of procedure
relating to appeal under the provisions of the Illinois act following the final award or decision of the Industrial Commission.
Since all rights under the workmen's compensation law
are purely statutory in origin, the right of recovery and the
procedure to be followed must be found in the act itself and
prescribed methods must be carefully followed. As the court,
in Village of Glencoe v. Industrial Commission,7 once said:
4 See Nega v. Chicago Rys. Co., 317 Ill. 482 at 493-4, 148 N. E. 250 at 254 (1925).
5 Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 405 at 410, 186 N. E. 140
at 143 (1933).
6 Other cases discussing the theory and purpose of the Illinois statute are Ervin
v. Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 56, 4 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936); Hays v. Illinois
Terminal Transp. Co., 363 Ill. 397, 2 N. E. (2d) 309 (1936) ; Lewin Metals Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 360 Ill. 371, 196 N. E. 482 (1935); Faber v.
Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 115, 185 N. E. 255 (1933) ; Sangamon County Mining
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 315 Ill. 532, 146 N. E. 492 (1925).
7 354 Ill. 190, 188 N. E. 329 (1933).
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Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation act are purely statutory. Compensation for injuries received by an employee was unknown at the common law. The jurisdiction conferred on the circuit
and superior courts to review findings of the commission by certiorari
is special. The writ of certiorari in this class of cases is not to be
confused with the common law writ of certiorari. The powers of
the court and the methods of procuring jurisdiction are specifically
defined in the Workmen's Compensation act, and courts can obtain
jurisdiction only in the manner provided by that statute.8

Careful observance of statutory requirements is, therefore,
essential. Such statutory provisions and judicial interpretations thereof are, consequently, set out in the following sections.
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW

Section 19 (f) (1) of the Illinois act presently declares:
The Circuit-Court of the county and the City Court of the city, if it
has more than twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants, where any
of the parties defendant may be found shall by, writ of certiorari to
the industrial commission have power to review all questions of law
and fact presented by such record. 9

The statute at one time made provision for review in the circuit
court of the county," but the act was amended in 1937 so as
to purport to give jurisdiction to review the decisions of the
Industrial Commission to certain of the city courts." Reference throughout this article to the circuit court must, therefore, be read so as to include within that term such city courts
as fall within the legislative classification. Very probably,
however, the city court would be lacking in jurisdiction unless
one or more of the parties in interest lived within the actual
limits of the city boundaries even though they lived in the
county in which the city and its court was located. 2
8 354 Il1. 190 at 193, 188 N. E. 329 at
Industrial Commission, 360 Ill. 371, 196
mission, 375 Ill. 107, 30 N. E. (2d) 615
9Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f)
10 Laws 1915. p. 410, § 19(f) (1).
11 Laws 1937, p. 559.
12 Werner v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 379

331. See also Lewin Metals Corporation v.
N. E. 482 (1935) ; Elles v. Industrial Com(1940).
(1).
Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), reversing

309 Ill. App. 292, 33 N. E. (2d) 121 (1941), noted in 21
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116. But see Moffett v. Green, 386 Il1. 318, 53 N. E. (2d) 941 (1944), which holds
that city courts have appellate jurisdiction over judgments of justices of the peace
within the township even though the cause of action arose outside the city and
could not have been litigated in the city court in the first instance.
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While the Superior Court of Cook County is not mentioned in the act, it has been held that such court may exercise
jurisdiction to review a decision of the Industrial Commission, pursuant to Section 19(f)(1), by reason of the fact that
it possesses the same jurisdiction and powers as the circuit
13
court.
TIME FOR APPEAL
The time allowed for the commencement of proceedings to
secure review by writ of certiorari is fixed at twenty days from
and after the receipt of notice of the decision of the Industrial

Commission." The twenty-day period referred to, according to
the holding in the case of Decatur Construction Company v.
Industrial Commission, 5 means "within twenty days of the
receipt of notice of the decision of the commission and not
from the time when it was made or filed."' 6 It sometimes
happens that the decision of the commission will have been
reached, entered and filed several days before notice of such
fact has been received, hence the statutory requirement that
time does not begin to run until receipt of notice of that fact
is a wise one.
Just what is meant by "receipt" of notice, however, is not
made too clear. Paragraph (i) of Section 19 of the act 7 does
provide that each party, upon taking any proceedings or steps
whatsoever before the arbitrator, committee of arbitration,
industrial commission or court, shall file with the Industrial
Commission his address or the name and address of his agent
upon whom all notices to be given such party shall be served.
That statute permits the giving of notice either personally or
by registered mail addressed to the last address so filed with
the commission. The "receipt" of notice, therefore, undoubtedly means delivery to the 'party or to his designated agent by
either of the means indicated. Notice to any other person
would, logically, seem insufficient to start the period running.
13 Yellow Cab Co. v. Industrial Commission, 333 Il1. 49, 164 N. E. 164 (1928);
Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 299 Ill. 159, 132 N. E. 541 (1921).
14 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1).
15 296 Ill. 290, 129 N. E. 738 (1921).
16 296 Ill. 290 at 292, 129 N. E. 738 at 739.
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(1).
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Such was the holding in American Gear Company v. Industrial Commission 8 where notice was sent to the attorneys
who had participated in and conducted all of the hearings
before the commission for one of the parties but who were
not properly listed as designated agents for that purpose. As
a consequence, such notice was held to be insufficient and
amounted to a mere voluntary act on the part of the commission. On the other hand, notice given to an attorney who was
designated as agent was held binding, in Strebing v. Indus9 despite the fact that another attorney was
trial Commission,"
subsequently retained and conducted the hearings, because no
substitution of agents or attorneys was made of record.
It should be remembered, in this connection, that upon
expiration of the twenty-day period from the date of receipt
of notice, if no proceedings for certiorari have been instituted,
the decision of the Industrial Commission becomes final and
conclusive." If review is contemplated, timely action is both
necessary and advisable.
NECESSITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

Judicial review of the action taken by administrative
tribunals is occasionally denied until the party has exhausted
all available remedies within the tribunal.21 For that reason
it is sometimes necessary to seek a rehearing or other review
before the tribunal itself before proceeding to seek judicial
action. In that regard, it should be noticed that Section 19(b)
of the act makes the decision of the arbitrator the final decision of the commission unless a petition for review is filed by
either party within fifteen days after the receipt by said party
of a copy of said decision.22 Should review before the coris

313 Ill. 427, 145 N. E. 180 (1924).
19 351 Ill. 627, 184, N. E. 886 (1933).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f), declares: "The decision of the industrial
commission acting within its powers, according to the provisions of paragraph (e)
of this section, shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive unless reviewed as in
this paragraph hereinafter provided.... ." Decisions so holding may be found in
Strebing v. Industrial Commission, 351 Il1. 627, 184 N. E. 886 (1933) ; Kudla v.
Industrial Commission, 336 Ill. 279, 168 N. E. 298 (1929) ; and Friedman Mfg. Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 284 Ill. 554, 120 N. E. 460 (1918).
21 In general, see 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, § 197. See also, for
example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 42, § 106, and Wabash E. Ry. Co. v. Com'rs East
Lake Fork Sp. Drain. Dist., 134 Il1. 384, 25 N. E. 781, 10 L. R. A. 205 (1890).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(b).
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mission be desired, the moving party is required, in addition
to the petition for review, to present, within twenty days after
receipt of a copy of such decision, an agreed statement of facts
or a correct transcript of the evidence before the arbitrator.'
The statute indicates that a failure to comply therewith
makes the arbitrator's decision the final decision of the commission and, in the absence of fraud, declares the same conclusive.
It was argued, in Jakub v. IndustrialCommission,23 that
since the aggrieved party had not availed herself of the statutory right to review by the Industrial Commission of the decision of the arbitrator, such decision was not subject to judicial review. The court, however, concluded that the circuit
court was given jurisdiction to review the record by certiorari
without the necessity of a review of the decision of arbitrator
by the commission. By failing to seek review before the commission, however, the party was held to have lost the privilege of introducing additional evidence.24
Subsequent to that decision, by an amendment adopted in
1936, the statute was changed so as to apparently limit the
scope of judicial review to those cases wherein internal review
before the commission had first been obtained. The, statute
then read:
(1) The Circuit Court of the county where any of the parties defendant may be found, except in such cases as arise in a proceeding in
which, under paragraph (b) of this section, the decision of the arbitrator or committee of arbitrationhas become the decision of the industrial commission, shall by writ of certiorari to the industrial commission have power to review all questions of law and fact presented
by such record .... 25

No decision was ever pronounced on the effect of the statute
as so amended, for at the next session of the legislature the
provision was again' amended to permit review by certain of
2s 288 Ill. 87, 123 N. E. 263 (1919).
See also Oelsner v. Industrial Commission,
305 Ill. 158, 137 N. E. 116, (1922).
24 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156 (e), requires the commission, on petition for
review, to promptly review the decision of the arbitrator, all questions of law or
fact which appear in the agreed statement of facts or transcript, and "such additional evidence as the parties may submit."
25 Laws 1935-6, Third Spec. Sess., p. 25.
Italics indicate the material added by
that amendment. The quoted section has never appeared in the various editions of
the revised statutes.

APPEALS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES

the city courts"6 and, in so doing, the italicized language,
whether by accident or design, was omitted and has never
since reappeared.
This peculiar circumstance raises a possible contention
that judicial review should be limited in scope, but in all probability, as the law now stands, an award of the arbitrator
which has become the decision of the Industrial Commission
because no petition for review has been filed can be examined
by the circuit court in like manner as a decision of the commission itself on proceedings for review. The Jakub case
would, therefore, still seem to be controlling.
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES

The common-law writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, issued only in the name of the sovereign although it
was issued at the instance of a proper petitioner.27 For that
reason, certiorari proceedings based on the common-law writ
are customarily entitled "People ex rel. [petitioner] v.
[respondent]." The writ of certiorari most frequently used
today, however, is one authorized by some particular statute
which usually differentiates from the common-law writ in
that it is granted as a matter of right rather than as a matter
of grace.2" Such statutes do not usually designate the style of
the writ, so there is some cause to wonder if the proceedings
thereunder should not be carried on in the fashion heretofore
existing. The Workmen's Compensation Act is likewise
silent on the point, but clarification has been added, at least
in Cook County, by rules of court which direct that "cases
arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act shall be entitled and docketed with the employee as plaintiff and the
employer as defendant."2 9
In certain counties of the state, however, the rules of the
circuit court are silent on this point and make no provision as
Laws 1937, p. 559; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1).
See 10 Am. Jur., Certiorari, § 2.
28 Compare Matthiessen v. Ott, 190 Ill. App. 301 (1914), affirmed in 268 Ill. 569,
109 N. E. 569 (1915), on the right to use the common-law writ, with Kudla v. In,
dustrial Commission, 336 Ill. 279, 168 N. E. 298 (1929), which discusses the nature
of the statutory writ available in workmen's compensation cases.
29 Circuit Court of Cook County, Rules revised to May 1, 1944, Rule 65.
The rule
of the Superior Court is identical in number and language.,
26
27
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to how the parties shall be designated. Such is also the case
with certain of the city courts. Absence of rules might lead
to question as to the correct style of the proceedings there
instituted, but it would seem as though such question should
be resolved in favor of the view adopted in Cook County particularly since such procedure has been followed in hundreds
of cases with no judicial disapproval and there is no express
statutory provision requiring a different method.
Docketing the cause in the Circuit Court may also present
a problem judging by the factual situation disclosed in Elles
v. Industrial Commission." There, on certiorari proceedings
following a decision of the industrial commission, the cause
The circuit court rewas designated as "Law No. 3967."
versed and remanded the case to the commission to hear additional evidence. After hearing additional evidence pursuant
to the remanding order, the commission again denied compensation. The claimant took out a second writ of certiorari"'
and all documents in connection therewith bore the same
number, to-wit: "Law No. 3967," that had been used in the
first proceeding. Such fact was advanced as one of the
grounds for a motion to quash the writ. On this point, the
court stated:
It is not disputed that this new decision of the Industrial Commission
could be reviewed only by a new and independent writ of certiorari
, . * The praecipe was actually filed and the writs of certiorari and
scire facias were issued by the clerk . . . nor did the clerk's failure

to enter a new case on the docket as provided by Section 16 of the act
relating to clerks of courts . . . affect the court's jurisdiction.
32
requirements are merely directory to the clerks.

The

VENUE

According to the statute, the appropriate court of the
county "where any of the parties defendant may be found" is33
the one possessing jurisdiction from the standpoint of venue.
At first glance, it might appear that since the writ of certiorari
Ill.
107, 30 N. E. (2d) 615 (1940).
A new writ was necessary in view of the decision in Western Shade Cloth Co.
570, 156 N. E. 796 (1927).
v. Industrial Commission, 325 Ill.
32375 Ill. 107 at 110, 30 N. E. (2d) 615 at 617.
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1).
30375
31
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is addressed to the Industrial Commission, it or the members
thereof are the "paities defendant" referred to, hence suit
should be brought wherever they might be found. While it
is true that the process runs against the commission and it is
the decision of that body which is to be subjected to review,
still the real persons concerned are the injured claimant and
the employer who is sought to be held for the injury. The
commission is, therefore, only a nominal party so venue must
be selected with reference to the real parties in interest. That,
at least, is the holding to be found in Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Company v. Industrial Commission 4 where the
court declared:
We are of the opinion that the words, in "the circuit court of the
county where any of the parties defendant may be found," do not
include members of the Industrial Board, and do not include, for the
suing out of the writ in the circuit court, the counties where the
members of the Industrial Board may be found. The only parties in
interest are the claimant and the employer. To hold otherwise, it
in absurd consequences, which the legislaseems to us, would 3result
5
ture never intended.

That view has also been expressed in two later cases.

6

If, by chance, the proceedings have been instituted in the
wrong county, there is authority, both by statute87 and by
judicial precedent,88 to permit the circuit court wherein the
proceedings were begun to transfer the cause to the proper
county.
PREPARING THE APPEAL

Before the. filing of the praecipe in the appropriate circuit
court, certain statutory details prescribed by the act must be
transacted. The litigant should first order the transcript of
the proceedings had before the commission on review, mentioned in paragraph (e) of Section 19 of the act, 9 which will
34232 I1. 136, 118 N. E. 483 (1917).
35 282 I1. 136 at 140, 118 N. E. 483 at 484-5.
30 Arcade Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board of Ill., 282 Il1. 27, 118 N. E. 486 (1917);
Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 293 11. 62, 127 N. E. 80
(1920).
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 146, § 36.
38 Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 293 Ill. 62, 127 N. E.
80 (1920).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(e).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

form the basis of the subsequent judicial review, and second,
pay the commission the amount of the probable cost of the
record as determined by the commission at the time of its
decision on review. 40 At the time of such payment, it is essential that the litigant procure a receipt therefor since such
receipt must be exhibited to the clerk before the writ of
4
certiorari issues. 1
A third preliminary detail, in the event review is sought
by the party against whom an award for the payment of
money has been made by the industrial commission, is to procure the execution of a bond in the amount fixed by the commission which must later be approved by the clerk of the
,court and filed with him at the time of filing the praecipe.42
This phase of the procedure is hereinafter discussed in more
43

detail.

THE PRAECIPE

The act of filing a praecipe in proper form and within the
proper statutory period is the beginning of the proceeding in
the circuit court and gives to that court jurisdiction to review
the proceedings of the Indfistrial Commission.4 The form of
such praecipe is not prescribed by the statute although certain matters which must appear therein are indicated and, as
to those, the statutory requirements must be strictly followed.
Where printed forms of praecipe are available,, such forms
may be followed provided care is taken, even though there is
no indicated space for such purpose, to see that the names and
addresses of the other parties in -interest, to be served with
scire facias, are contained in the praecipe. In many of the
counties, however, no printed forms are provided by the clerk
40Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1), directs that: "In its decision on review the industrial commission shall determine in each particular case the amount
of the probable cost of the record to be filed as a return to the writ of certiorari in
that case. .. ."
41 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1), states: "...
and no praecipe for a

writ of certiorari may be filed and no writ of certiorari shall issue unless the party
seeking to review the decision .

.

. shall exhibit to the clerk .

payment of the sums so determined. ..

.

. a receipt showing

."

42 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (2).
43 See note 83, et seq., post.
44 See Oriental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 539, 127 N. E. 676
(1920) ; Levy v. Industrial Commission, 346 Ill. 49, 178 N. E. 370 (1931).
Other
jurisdictional facts are considered at note 52, et seq., post.
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of the circuit court, hence resort to standard collections of
forms may become necessary."

When preparing the praecipe, it should be remembered
that the statute specifically directs that the praecipe "shall
contain the last known addresses of the other parties in interest and their attorneys of record"46 so that a writ of scire
facias may be served on them. As a consequence, it is necessary that the praecipe shall not only direct the issuance of the
writ of certiorari to, the Industrial Commission directing it to
certify a transcript of its proceedings but should also direct
the issuance of all necessary writs of scire facias.
Failure to include in the praecipe the names of all parties
in interest may provide grounds for quashing the writ of

certiorari, according to the decision in Matthiessen & Hegeler

Zinc Company v. Industrial Commission." In that case, a
suit for compensation instituted by a widow in her own name,
the award had been made to the widow "for the support of
herself and said minor children" after suitable amendment of
the application had-been made to show that the deceased employee left minor dependents. The praecipe did not name the
minors or make them parties to .the proceeding either personally or by next friend. The action of the circuit court in
quashing the writ of certiorari was affirmed when the Illinois
Supreme Court noted that:
It is fundamental that the jurisdiction exercised by the circuit courts
under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a special statutory one,
and the parties seeking a hearing in the circuit court must comply
'with all the conditions prescribed . . . A praecipe in due form is
necessary in order to give the court jurisdiction ...

Here the praecipe

in no way mentioned the minor dependents, who, on plaintiff in
error's own motion, were made parties to the proceedings before the
Industrial Commission. We are not called upon to decide whether
they were necessary parties there. That they were parties in interest
cannot be doubted .

.

. By failing to make these minor dependents

45 Forms of praecipe, not necessarily approved by the author, may be found in
Nichols -Illinois Civil Practice (Callaghan & Co., 1942), Vol. 5, § 5598; Wermuth,
Illinois Forms and Precedents (The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1931), 2d Ed., Vol. 2, Form
1482; Edmunds, Illinois Civil Practice Forms (Callaghan & Co., 1933), Vol. 4, No.
1966.
46 IlI.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1).
47 373 Ill. 294, 26 N. E. (2d) 84 (1940).
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or their next friend parties to the certiorari proceeding, plaintiff
48
in error did not meet the requirements of the statute.

In a still more recent case, that of Elles v. Industrial
Commission,4 9 the person seeking the writ was named as

executrix rather than as an individual or as a widow. It was
argued that such misnomer justified the action of the trial.
court in quashing the writ, but that judgment was reversed
and the writ was held sufficient to warrant a hearing on the
merits. The court seems to have based such holding largely
upon the fact that the attorney for the employer had stipulated away the right to complain of the error, for the court
said:
The record discloses that Orian J. Elles was the sole dependent of
the deceased employee. It also shows that, at the suggestion of one
of the attorneys for the employer, it was stipulated that notice and
demand were duly and properly given, and, in counsel's own language: "We can stipulate that Orian J. Elles is the legal widow of
Albert K. Elles and dependent upon him under the provisions of the
act." 'He further stipulated she was the duly qualified and acting
executrix and "that it is the same executrix that is the widow." Later
he stated: "We have stipulated the dependency of the widow and
notice and demand." In view of this, defendants in error were in
no position to raise this question for the first time in the circuit
court. By entering into this stipulation they must be deemed to
have waived the question of whether Orian J. Elles was properly
described in the application. The stipulation shows she was regarded
as and was in fact the beneficial party, the dependent widow. Since
she was the sole dependent no one can be injured if the money is
paid to her as executrix. We, therefore, hold this constituted no
ground for quashing the writ.05

That decision, therefore, cannot be said to conflict with the
holding in the Matthiessen case, so the rule thereof may apparently still be regarded as the established law of this state."

48 373 Ill. 294 at 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 84 at 85.
49 375 Il. 107, 30 N. E. (2d) 615 (1940).
50375 Ill. 107 at 111, 30 N. E. (2d) 615 at 617-8
91 It is understood that in Jacob v. Industrial Commission, Ill. Supreme Court,
docket No. 28187, September term, 1944, the court denied a petition for writ of
error directed toward the action of the Circuit Court of Cook County in quashing
a writ of certiorari on motion of defendant based on the ground that the names of
the employer and its attorneys were omitted from the praceipe even though they
were served with a writ of scire facias. No opinion for publication.
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PAYMENT OF COSTS

It is contemplated, by the statute, that the Industrial
Commission should not be required to respond to the writ of
certiorari at its own expense and should be entitled to compensation, at statutory rates, to cover the cost of preparing
the record.52 For that reason, the statute also directs that no
writ shall issue unless the party seeking review exhibits to the
clerk of the court a receipt showing payment of the estimated
charges.
A failure to present such receipt would seem to warrant
sustaining a motion to quash the writ of certiorari inasmuch
as the statute speaks in mandatory terms. That view has the
support of judicial precedent, for in Moweaqua Coal Mining
& Manufacturing Company v. Industrial Commission,5 " the
co'urt affirmed a judgment quashing the writ upon a showing,
supported by affidavit, that the amdunt of the probable costs
therein was not paid to the commission until almost three
months after the filing of the praecipe. In support of such
decision, the court said:
The method of bringing before the circuit court for consideration the
record of the Industrial Commission is purely statutory, and the
court can obtain jurisdiction of the proceeding only in the manner
provided by statute . . . The jurisdiction exercised by the circuit
courts under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a special statutory
jurisdiction, and 'the parties seeking a hearing in the circuit court
under this statute must comply with all the conditions prescribed.
The statute says plainly that no praecipe for a writ of certiorari may
be filed and no writ shall issue until the parties seeking the writ shall
exhibit to the circuit clerk a receipt showing payment of the amount
of the probable cost of the record to be filed as a return to the writ
of certiorari. The purpose of the statute is to coerce the payment of
an amount sufficient to cover the cost of the record which the Industrial Commission must prepare. The Legislature has seen fit to make
the payment of this amount a condition precedent to the issuance of
the writ. The language of the statute is plain, and there is no room
"The industrial commission
2 li. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1), states:
shall not be required to certify the record of their proceedings . . . unless the party
commencing the proceedings for review ... shall pay to the commission the sum
of fourteen cents per one hundred words of testimony taken before said commission, and eight cents per one hundred words of all other matters contained in such
record.... " The rates mentioned are less than those permitted other tribunals
under more recent statutes. See Ill. Stat. 1943, Ch. 91, § 62c, or Ch. 131%, § 10c,
for comparisons.
53322 Ill. 403, 153 N. E. 678 (1926).
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for construction.

The clerk had no authority to issue the writ,

and it was properly quashed on motion. Where the facts showing the
writ was improperly issued are not apparent'from aninspection of
the record, the practice in certiorari is to hear extrinsic evidence iri
54
support of the motion.

Inability to pay court costs may require the granting of
permission to sue in forma pauperis in order that justice may
not be denied." Whether that relief extends to cover the cost
of procuring the record from the Industrial Commission is a
matter of some doubt for there is no precise authority on the
subject. The case of Visioni v. Industrial Commission" may
throw some light on that subject, even though it arises under
the Occupational Diseases Act 5 7 rather than the Workmen's
Compensation Act, for the provisions of the two statutes are
identical in this regard. In that case, the employee moved in
the circuit court for leave to sue as a poor person simultaneously with the filing of his praecipe for writ of certiorari.
.That court, on ex parte hearing, granted such request and
directed the commission to certify a transcript of its proceedings "without exhibiting the receipt showing payment" of the
cost of preparing the record. The employer moved to quash
the writ on the ground that, among other things, the court
did not have jurisdiction because the estimated cost of the
record had not been paid and the receipt therefor had not been
exhibited at the time the praecipe was filed. The motion was
denied and that action was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme
Court on the ground that the authority to waive costs given
to the court by statute" was not limited to the costs of the
court itself but might extend to cover those of the commission
also, at least so long as the commission itself did not refuse
to respond to the writ. 9 To the point that production of the
receipt was a jurisdictional element essential to support the
action, the court stated:
...

Wedo hold that the exhibition to the clerk of the receipt for the

322 Ill. 403 at 405, 153 N. E. 678-9.
55Il.Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
56 379 Ill.
608, 42 N. E. (2d) 64 (1942).
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 172.1 et seq.
58 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 33, § 5.
54

59 The court refused to pass on the question as to the right of the court to require
the commission to make return without first being paid its charges on the ground
608 at 614, 42 N. E. (2d) 64 at 67.
such question was not before it: 379 Ill.
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estimated cost of the transcript, at the time the praecipe is filed, is
not a jurisdictional requirement which cannot be waived by the court,
where an appropriate order is entered under the Costs act permitting
the one desiring to have the decision of the Industrial Commission
reviewed to "commence and prosecute" his suit as a poor person without exhibiting such receipt or the payment of costs. If no such order
is entered the clerk must observe the statute and decline to issue the
writ, unless such receipt is exhibited. 60

It would seem, therefore, that a comparable result should be
achieved under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Ability to waive the costs rests in the court rather than
in the clerk, so due regard should be given to the last sentence
of the quotation from the Visioni case. If no judicial order as
to costs is obtained, the clerk has no right to issue the writ
without the production of the receipt for the estimated costs
of the commission and his improvident act in so doing is open
to criticism."
The right of the Industrial Commission to charge fees for
preparing the record is subject to the qualification that the
commission itself may, upon being satisfied that the employee
is a poor person, dispense with all charges on condition that
the same shall later be deducted from any award that might
be recovered 2 Certainly, if the commission has entered such
an order, it would be required to make return to the writ of
certiorari and proof of that fact would make it unnecessary to
produce a receipt for estimated costs at the time of filing the
praecipe. In the absence of such action on the part of the
commission, however, it is extremely doubtful that the court
would have power to compel the commission to make return
even though it might, on motion for leave to sue as a poor person, absolve the litigant from the necessity of producing such
receipt or paying the customary filing fees due the clerk of the
court. There is no provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act which goes to that length, nor is there any known
provision under any other statute of the state which grants to
Iii. 608 at 614-5, 42 N. E. (2d) 64 at 67.
61 Moweaqua Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 322 Ill. 403, 153 N. E. 678 (1926).
62 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156a. There is no comparable provision in the
Occupational Diseases Act, hence the Industrial Commission, in Visioni v. Industrial Commission, 379 Ill. 608, 42 N. E. (2d) 64 (1942), felt itself constrained to
deny the request therein made for leave to proceed as a poor person.
60 379
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a court the power to abrogate the right of the administrative
tribunal to its statutory charges.
Payment of charges due the clerk of the court for docketing the cause is a customary incident to the institution of litigation. Refusal to pay such charges in advance, except where
leave is given to sue as a poor person, would justify the clerk
in refusing to accept the praecipe or docket the certiorari proceeding.6 3 The fact that the clerk may see fit to accept the
praecipe without payment of his just charges in advance is no
ground for quashing the writ, as such matter is not considered to be a jurisdictional element. That point was urged in

Elles v. Industrial Commission,64 but was rejected on the
ground that the statute which requires payment of fees in
advance was merely directory and the failure of the clerk to

demand payment in advance would not prevent the court
from obtaining jurisdiction.6
AMENDING THE PRAECIPE
Although the Civil Practice Act contains liberal provision
for the amendment of pleadings in an action 'so as to enable a
party "to sustain the claim for which it was intended- to be:
brought,"6 6 that statute has no application to proceedings
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 7 As a consequence,
it has been determined that a defective praecipe, once filed,
cannot be amended. In Levy v. Industrial Commission,"8
for example, the employer filed a praecipe for a writ of
certiorari on July 31, 1930, and on the same day the clerk
issued writs, both of certiorari and scire facias, returnable on the third Monday in October, 1930. The statute at that time, since amended,6 9 directed that the
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 53, § 31, declares: "The fees of the clerk of the circuit
court . . . shall be paid in advance ... "
64 375 Ill. 107, 30 N. E. (2d) 615 (1940).
65 See also Dowie v. Chicago, Waukegan & North Shore Railway Co., 214 Ill. 49,
73 N. E. 354 (1905).
66 I11. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 170.
67 Ibid., § 125.
6s 346 Ill. 49, 178 N. E. 370 (1931).
69 Laws 1933, p. 592. The present provision on this point now reads: "...
Such
writ of certiorari and writ of scire facias shall be issued by the clerk of such court
upon praecipe returnable on a designated return day, not less than ten or more
than sixty days from the date of issuance thereof ... " See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943,
Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1).
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writs should be "returnable to the next succeeding
term of the circuit court, providing ten days shall intervene
from the date of issuance thereof and the first day of the next
succeeding term of court.""0 The first day of the August term
of the circuit court, the "next succeeding term," fell more
than ten days after the time when the praecipe in question
was filed, so the writs should have been made returnable to
that term rather than to the October one. The claimant, appearing specially, moved to quash the writ for error in the
return date. The employer, with leave of court, filed a crossmotion to amend the praecipe and the writs by substituting
the words "August term" in place of the words "October
term" wherever the latter words appeared in such documents.
Upon subsequent hearing, the trial judge denied such crossmotion on the ground that an amendment could not cure the
defect and allowed the motion to quash.
That decision was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court,
on writ of error, when that court also concluded that amendment of the praecipe could not be permitted. In that regard,
the court stated:
The sole question at issue is whether the Statute of Amendments and
Jeofails . . . and section 39 of the Practice Act . . . gave the circuit

court the power to amend the defective praecipe and the writs of
certiorari and scire facias.
This court has held that a summons returnable to the wrong term is
a nullity and will not authorize a judgment . . . While circuit courts

are courts of general jurisdiction, their powers are limited by the
language of the statute when they exercise a special jurisdiction derived solely from the statute. The writ of certiorari, by which the
circuit court is given power to review the award of the Industrial
Commission in compensation cases, is wholly statutory, and the
authority of the court to make any order must be found in the statute
...In reviewing decisions of the Industrial Commission, the writ of
certiorari is not the common law writ, but is a statutory writ, and the
circuit court has only such powers as the statute confers . . . In com-

pensation cases the circuit court can only look to the provisions of the
Worlkmen's Compensation Act to determine whether it has jurisdiction of the persons of the litigants. When a review on a writ of
certiorari is sought, jurisdiction over the person is accomplished
70 Smith-Hurd Ill. Anno. Stats., Ch. 48, § 156(f)(1), sets forth the text of the
1925 amendment which first imposed a time limitation on the return. Prior to that
time, the statute was silent on this .point.
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when the case sought to be reviewed is laid to the proper term. Here
the August and September terms intervened between the issuance of
the writs and the October term, to which they were made returnable,
and ten days intervened between the date the writs were issued and
the first day of the August term. The writs were therefore a nullity
and failed to confer that jurisdiction of the persons of the litigants
which would authorize the court to allow an amendment at the Octo71
ber term.

A subsequent change in the statute, undoubtedly made
necessary in order to assimilate the practice somewhat with
that followed in case of return of ordinary process 72 now
directs that the writs of certiorari and scire facias shall be
returnable "on a designated return day not less than ten or
7
more than sixty days from the date of the issuance thereof."
The identical problem of the Levy case is not, therefore, likely
to arise again, but as definite limits are still set upon the process issued it would still seem that substantial defects in the
praecipe growing out of failure to comply with statutory requirements would prevent the court from acquiring jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person and
would provide sufficient ground for dismissing the proceeding
on motion made under special or limited appearance.
The holding in Elles v. Industrial Commission" does not
contradict this view though it does throw more light on the
return day which should appear in the praecipe and the writs
issued thereunder. The writs therein were made returnable
on August 10, 1937, which date was within the proper statutory time period fixed by the amended statute but which date
fell on a Tuesday. One ground urged under a special appearance and motion to quash the writs was that the same were
not returnable on the first or third Monday in the month as is
necessary in the case of other ordinary process.7" The petitioner sought leave to amend by changing the return date, but
this was denied and the writ was quashed by the trial court.
When the case reached the Illinois Supreme Court on writ
of error, that court reversed the decision of the trial court,
346
I1.
73 I1.
74375
75 I1.
71
72

IU. 49 at 51-2, 178 N. E. 370 at 371.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 259.4.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1).
II. 107, 30 N. E. (2d) 615 (1940).
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 259.4.
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not because amendment should have been permitted but rather
because amendment was unnecessary. It noted that the problem involved the question as to whether the Civil Practice Act
provisions, and the rules thereunder, applied to process issued
in workmen's compensation cases, but decided that such was
not the case by reason of the exception created by Section 1
thereof.76 That exception was not deemed in any way affected by Rule 2 of the Illinois Supreme Court77 which purports to make the provisions of the Civil Practice Act apply
where the separate statutes governing particular statutory
actions are silent on procedural questions. When concluding
that the return date in the writs in question was properly
fixed, the court said:
Thus, it is apparent that the provisions of the Civil Practice act and
rules of this court do not apply to cases arising under the Workmen's
Compensation act, in so far as or to the extent that the procedure is
regulated by section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation act . . .
There would be no justification for our reading into this statute that
part of rule No. 4 concerning return days. Nor is there any reason
to invoke rule No. 2 of this court, that the Civil Practice act shall
apply to matters of procedure not regulated by separate statutes. The
matter of when the writs of certiorari and scire facias are returnable
is regulated by the Workmen's Compensation act., In such case, that
same rule provides the provisions of the separate statute shall apply.
To uphold defendants in error's contention would be to read into the
statute an additional element not found therein.7 8

The distinction between the Levy case and the Elles case,
therefore, lies in the fact that in the former case the writs
were not returnable in the fashion directed by the Workmen's
Compensation Act while, in the latter, they did not comply
with the Civil Practice Act though they did measure up to the
requirements of the statute under which they were issued.
Since the practice statute was deemed inapplicable, 79 the result achieved in the Elles case was both proper and consistent
with the earlier holding. It may be concluded, then, that the
Ibid., § 125.
Ibid., § 259.2.
78 375 Ill. 107 at 113, 30 N. E. (2d) 615 at 618.
79 In Village of Glencoe v. Industrial Commission, 354 Ill. 190 at 193, 188 N. E.
329 at 331 (1933), the court had noted that the provisions of the Civil Practice
Act granting municipalities exemption from the requirement of bond had no application to workmen's compensation cases.
76
77
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praecipe must be drafted with care since no amendment
thereof, after filing, will be permitted.
ALIAS WRITS

If, for any reason, service of the writs of certiorari or scire
facias cannot be had within the time fixed for their return, a
question could well arise as to whether alias writs might be
issued in view of the fact that the Workmen's Compensation
Act is silent on this point. Such alias writs would clearly be
invalid if based on an insufficient praecipe for the court has
acquired no jurisdiction of any kind upon the filing of that
worthless document. When a valid praecipe has been filed in
apt time, though, the court has obtained jurisdiction over the
subject matter hence should be in a position to complete its
authority by obtaining jurisdiction over the persons concerned. If that cannot be done by the original writs, then the
court would be powerless if it lacked the ability to issue as
many alias or pluries writs as might be necessary until personal jurisdiction was secured.
That problem was, in fact, presented in Oriental Laundry
Company v. Industrial Commission" wherein the original
counsel for the petitioner seeking certiorari had caused writs
of certiorari and scire facias to be promptly issued on a proper
praecipe but had inadvertently failed to deliver the same to
the sheriff for service and the original writs had become lost.
Almost a year later, substituted counsel for petitioner made
affidavit as to these facts and asked the court to order that
alias writs should issue. Such order was entered, but on special appearance the respondent questioned the jurisdiction of
the court on the ground that the Workmen's Compensation
Act gave no authority for such action. The Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the action of the trial court and stated:
To hold that the circuit court had no authority to enter an order
directing alias writs of certiorari and scire facias when there was a
praecipe on file, and in view of the proof of loss of the previous
papers, would, in our judgment, be contrary to the intention of the
Legislature and the purposes and wording of the act. The conclusion
80293 IlM. 539, 127 N. E. 676 (1920).
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follows that the circuit court did not err in holding that it had juris8
diction under the alias writ. '

Service of process on the respondents within the statutory
period does not, therefore, become essential to proper commencement of the proceedings for review as the court would
acquire jurisdiction over the cause immediately upon the filing of a proper praecipe s2 Resort to alias writs, if necessary,
may be taken to perfect the jurisdiction thus acquired.
THE BOND'

The Workmen's Compensation Act directs that no writ
of certiorari shall issue "unless the one against whom the industrial commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money" shall file, with his praecipe, a bond conditioned that if he shall not successfully prosecute the writ he'
will pay "the award and the costs of the proceedings in said
court. 8' 3 The amount of such bond is to be fixed by any mem'ber of the commission, but the surety is to be approved by the
clerk of the court.
The legislative purpose of requiring bond only from the
one against whom an award for the payment of money has
been made is best illustrated by a quotation from the decision

in Nierman v. Industrial Commission. 4

The court there

stated:
The bond which the employer is required to give before he is permitted to prosecute a writ of certiorari from the circuit court to
review an award makes unnecessary the rendition by the circuit court
of a judgment for the payment of money in case the decision of the
Industrial Commission is confirmed . . . If every award of compensa-

tion confirmed by the circuit court upon review necessarily resulted
in a judgment subjecting the employer's property to a lien for the
payment of the award, the number of such liens would not only be
considerable, but the liens might continue for many years, and the
employer's property, particularly his real estate, would be rendered
81 293 Ill.539 at 544, 127 N. E. 676 at 677-8. The court noted that while Fruit
v. Industrial Board, 284 Il. 154, 119 N. E. 931 (1918), was not directly in point, it
justified a fair inference that alias writs would be authorized under the statute
where the original praecipe was filed in apt time if the original process was not
served since this "necessitated the issuance of the alias writ."
82 On this point generally, see Schroeder v. Mer. & Mechanics' Ins. Co., 104 Ill. 71
at 74-5 (1882).
83 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (2).
S4 329 Ill.
623, 161 N. E. 115 (1928).
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unmarketable. The employer has the right, by giving the required
bond, to avoid such a judgment and consequent lien . . . The legislative intention is that the employee shall be protected by the bond.85

In case review were sought by the disappointed claimant for
compensation, no such bond would be needed, hence the legislature has not required that bond be filed by every person
seeking review of the action of the Industrial Commission.
Where bond is necessary, however, the statutory requirement becomes an element necessary to proper institution of
the proceedings, is jurisdictional in effect, and non-compliance
therewith would warrant dismissing the proceedings. So important, in fact, is the requirement that the bond not only be
filed but that the sureties thereon be approved by the clerk
that omission on the latter point cannot later be rectified by a
nunc pro tunc order. The record must, to support review, be
complete in all respects before jurisdiction exists.
The leading case on that point is that of Village of
Glencoe v. Industrial Commission" wherein praecipe and
bond were filed on December 31, 1931. Several months later,
the claimant moved to quash the writ of certiorari on the
ground that the sureties on the bond had not been approved
by the clerk when the bond was filed. A cross-motion was
interposed by the employer seeking an order of court, to be
entered nunc pro tunc as of December 31, 1931, directing the
clerk to affix his signature as approving the bond on that date.
That motion was supported by an affidavit of the deputy clerk
stating that he did, in fact, approve the bond at the time when
it was first presented but had omitted to indorse the clerk's
approval thereon. The cross-motion was granted by the trial
court although it affirmed the award on the merits of the case.
On writ of error to the Illinois Supreme Court, the claimant
contended that the trial court was without jurisdiction to
enter any order other than one quashing the writ, to which
the employer replied that (1) bond was not required of municipal employers," or (2), if required, it had been approved,
85

329 Ill. 623 at 626, 161 N. E. 115 at 116.

86 354 Ili. 190, 188 N. E. 329 (1933).
87 That contention was based on the claim that the exemption of the Civil Practice Act, 1Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 206(3), applied to proceedings under the
compensation act. The court held it did not. The compensation act was subsequently amended on this point; see note 93, post.
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and (3) the error was waived by claimant's general appearance in the cause.
With respect to the second contention, i. e. that the bond
was, in fact, approved, the court distinguished the situation
before it from that presented in the Moweaqua case,88 and
said:
To confer jurisdiction on the court under the Workmen's Compensation Act it is necessary to make a record in compliance with that act.
Here the record shows no approval of the bond. So far as appears
from the record this jurisdictional requirement was not met when
the bond and praecipe were filed. In that condition of the record the
court did not obtain jurisdiction and the writ of certiorari should not
have been issued. The praecipe and bond were filed December 31,
1931. The motion for an order nunc pro tunc directing the clerk to
affix his name to the bond was not made until October 24, 1932, long
after the twenty days given the employer to complete his application
for writ of certiorari had expired. During all that time the court
had before it a record showing no jurisdiction of the subject matter,
and, of course, could not by a nunc pro tunc order confer jurisdiction
of the subject matter on itself. Neither could an affidavit be made
effective for such purpose. It has long been the rule that court records may not be amended by affidavit as here attempted. Such records
import verity ...

We are of the opinion, therefore, that the court did

not obtain jurisdiction of the subject matter by the filing of a praecipe
for certiorari and a bond which, so far as the record shows, was not
approved. The question whether a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter is one always open, and the court may of its own motion
dismiss the proceeding where want of such jurisdiction appears.8 9

To the argument that formal insufficiencies in the appeal
bond were not sufficient to prevent jurisdiction from attaching to the reviewing court, the higher court said:
Such is not the rule, however, where jurisdiction of the subject-matter depends on compliance with the statute. In the case before us the
question of jurisdiction of the court to review the award of the commission is, as we have said, wholly statutory, and in the absence of
complete compliance with the act jurisdiction of the subject-matter
is not obtained. 90

Clearly, then, the provisions of the statute relative to filing
88 Moweaqua Coal Mining-& Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 322 Ill. 403, 153
N. E. 678 (1926). The point there involvdd is discussed above. See footnote 53,
ante.
89 354 Ill. 190 at 195-6, 188 N. E. 329 at 332.
90 354 Ill. 190 at 196, 188 N. E. 329 at 332.
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a bond in the amount fixed by the Industrial Commission become jurisdictional requirements and the clerk of the court is
not only without authority to issue a writ of certiorari until
such bond is filed and approved but should not be compelled to
do so by writ of mandamus. Moreover, the person seeking
review should be sure to ascertain that formal approval of the
bond is suitably endorsed thereon at the time of its filing so
that the record will be complete in this respect.
Financial inability to secure the necessary bond affords no
legal excuse for failure to comply with statutory requirements, nor can it be urged that inability to provide bond
would deprive the employer of his constitutional right to seek
judicial review of an award unless some other avenue were
open to him. Such was the problem posed in People ex rel.
Radium Dial Company v. Ryan,9' a case growing out of the
Occupational Diseases Act, wherein the employer sought review of an award which was claimed to be wholly void.92 According to the facts therein, the claimant had secured an
award and the commission had fixed the amount of the bond
to be filed in certiorari proceedings at $10,000. The employer
paid the costs of the transcript and filed the necessary praecipe
but did not offer any bond. The clerk, upon failure to present
bond, refused to issue the writs of certiorari and scire facias.
The employer then petitioned the circuit court to order the
clerk to accept the record and issue such writs without the
giving of bond as required by the statute. Such petition was
denied. Original proceedings for mandamus were then instituted in the Illinois Supreme Court by the employer predicated on the ground that it was unable to secure a bond with
surety and that to refuse to review a void award unless bond
was given was tantamount to depriving the employer of due
process of law.
Mandamus was denied when the Illinois Supreme Court
determined that no violation of constitutional rights had occurred for the court indicated that the case was not one in
which no judicial review was provided for but rather one in
91 371 Il1. 597, 21 N. E. (2d) 749 (1939).
92 The invalidity of the award was said to lie in the fact that the employment
had terminated in 1931 and the finding of the commission was that disability arose
in 1934, long after the termination of employment.
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which such review was permitted only upon terms imposed by
the legislature. If those terms were not clearly unreasonable,
then review was possible only in the manner fixed by the statute. The court found that a requirement of bond as a condition precedent to review was not unreasonable, so concluded
that the employer had not established a clear legal right to
require the granting of mandamus. As the legality of the proceedings before the commission could have been reviewed in
the manner provided by the statute had bond been given, the
court decided that the fact such proceedings were void was no
reason to change the legislative requirement of a bond as a
condition precedent to the issuance of the writ of certiorari.
Subsequent to the decision in the Village of Glencoe case,
and apparently with an eye to adopting one of the arguments
advanced by the municipality therein, the legislature inserted
an additional provision into the Workmen's Compensation
Act which reads as follows:
The State and every county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school district, body politic or municipal corporation having a
population of five hundred thousand or more against whom the industrial commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of
money shall not be required to file a bond to secure the payment of
said award and the costs of the proceeding in said court to authorize
said court to issue such writ of certiorari. 93

Inherent in such additional provision was a problem as to
whether the population limitation there fixed applied to counties as well as the lesser political subdivisions or related only
to the latter.
That problem was resolved in the case of County of St.

Clair v. Industrial Commission94 in which the commission
made an award against the employer and fixed bond in the
amount of $1,500. The employer, County of St. Clair, filed a
praecipe and exhibited a receipt showing payment of the

probable cost of the record but did not furnish any bond.
Motion was subsequently made by the employee to quash the
writs of certiorari and scire facias because of the county's

failure to comply with the statutory requirement concerning
bond.

The employer contended that no bond was necessary

93 Laws 1935, p. 866; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (2).
94 380 Il. 376, 44 N. E. (2d) 30 (1942).
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because, being a county, it had the benefit of the statutory
exception even though its total population was less than
500,000. The writs were quashed in the trial court and that
decision was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. That
court noted the change. in the statute since its decision in the
Village of Glencoe case, but stated the problem before it to be
one of construction of said amendment. It said:
we are asked to construe the second paragraph as though it read:
The State and every county, and every city, etc., having a population
of 500,000 or more shall not be required to file a bond. In order for
us to so hold it would be necessary for us to construe this statute as
though a county was in a different classification than a city, town or
...

township ... There is nothing in the amendment that is ambiguous or

obscure. Two types of public corporations are exempted from filing
bonds-first, the State; second, every county, city, township, incorporated village, school district, body politic, or municipal corporation
having a population of 500,000 or more. In the ordinary use of the
English language there is no possibility in creating three classifications, viz.-first, the State; second, the county; and third, political
subdivisions having 500,000 or more. We take judicial notice of the
fact that St. Clair county does not have more than 500,000 population,
and therefore under the statute as it exists it would have required the
filing of a bond in the amount fixed by the Industrial Commission to
give the circuit court of St. Clair county jurisdiction.9"

Bond is still required, therefore, in the case of most municipal
or political employers.
THE RECORD

It is provided, in the final'sentence of sub-section (e) of
Section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, that:
The applications for adjustment of claim and other documents in the
nature of pleadings filed by either party, together with the decisions
of the arbitrator and of the industrial commission and the statement
of facts or transcripts of evidence hereinbefore provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) shall be the record of the proceedings of said commission, and shall be subject to review as hereinafter provided. 9 6
95 380 Ill. 376 at 379, 44 N. E. (2d) 30 at 31.
6Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(e). Attention is called to an error in the
quoted sentence. Paragraphs "(b) and (c)" should be paragraphs "(b) and (e),"
inasmuch as no mention is made of any statement of facts or transcript of evidence
in paragraph "(c)." Obviously, paragraph (e) was meant by the framers because
it is in such paragraph that provision is made for a statement of facts or transcript
of the proceedings had on review. Nevertheless, the indicated error appears in the
printed copies of the act distributed by the Industrial Commission and also in the
various editions of the statutes.
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The record compiled by the Industrial Commission in conformity with the foregoing statutory provision is the record
to be prepared and certified by it to the circuit court as its
return to the writ of certiorari. Hearing in the circuit court
will, of course, be confined to such record for that court has
no authority to try the case de novo or even to hear any additional evidence. 7
The record of the Industrial Commission, being a public
record, imports verity and is presumed to speak the truth. The
reviewing court must, then, act upon the transcript of the record'as certified." If the record should fail to speak the truth
it is not competent for the circuit court to alter the record
although it has power to authorize the withdrawal thereof so
that additions or corrections might be made therein. In that
regard; the Illinois Supreme Court has held that no consideration should be given to an evidentiary exhibit omitted from
the record filed in the circuit court even though supplied to
the court by the parties, and they have refused to consider
such an exhibit when it. was sent up to the higher court by
stipulation of the parties. 9 All such errors and omissions in
the record must, therefore, be remedied by the Industrial
Commission before the case is submitted to the circuit court
for decision.
As the entire record is brought up for review on certiorari,
there is no occasion for any "cross-writ of certiorari" in workmen's compensation cases as would be necessary in the case
of review of ordinary civil causes.'1° The other party may,
therefore, preserve his right to raise any question based on
the record or in the decision being reviewed without the

97 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1) and (2).
See also Plano Foundry Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 356 Ill. 186, 190 N. E. 255 (1934) ; Merritt v. Industrial
Commission, 322 Ill. 160, 152 N. E. 505 (1926).
98 The 'same rule applies in case writ of error is issued to the circuit court, for
the record on review is the sole, conclusive and unimpeachable evidence of the proceedings: Village of Glencoe v. Industrial Commission, 354 Ill. 190, 188 N. E. 329
(1933) ; Strebing v. Industrial Commission, 351 Ill. 627, 184 N. E. 886 (1933).
99 Lawrence Ice Cream Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 Ill. 175, 131 N. E. 369
(1921) ;'Lumbermen's Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 303 Ill. 364, 135 N. E.
756 (1922).
100 As to the necessity for notice of cross appeal in ordinary civil cases, see Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 203 and § 259.35.
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necessity of seeking a cross-writ of certiorari, or being obliged
to request an independent writ in his own right.'
When the steps herein mentioned have been correctly
taken, the decision of the Industrial Commission is ready for
judicial review, but the scope and extent of that review must
be left for treatment at another time.
(To be continued)*
101 Murrelle v. Industrial Commission, 382 Ill. 128, 46 N. E. (2d) 1007 (1943).
* The balance of this article will appear in the September issue.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADOPTION DECREES
William F. Zacharias*

N

O SMALL amount of discussion has been evoked by the
recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case
of Ekendahl v. Svolos' wherein a petition was filed in the
appropriate County Court praying for a decree of adoption on
the ground that the minor child therein named had been abandoned and deserted. The natural parents were made parties
defendant and were duly served. The natural mother answered the petition and contested the allegations and the
prayer thereof but, after hearing, an order of adoption was
entered. Appeal was taken from that order, by the natural
mother, to the Appellate Court for the First District. The
petitioners moved to dismiss such appeal on the ground that
there was no authority in law for either appeal or writ of
error in adoption cases. That court denied such motion, considered the appeal on the merits and reversed the decree of
adoption. 2 Leave to appeal having been granted, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed that decision on the same ground as
that suggested in petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Earlier decisions in Illinois on the point bear out this
view,3 but they rested on the fact that, at the outset, the natural parents were not parties to the adoption proceedings, or,
when made parties by statutory mandate,4 that the proceeding
was not a "case" according to the common law, hence any
semblance of judicial review was possible only through
*Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law..
1388 Ii. 412, 58 N. E. (2d) 585 (1945), reversing In

re Petition of Ekendahl,
321 Ill. App. 457, 53 N. E. (2d) 302 (1944), noted in 39 Ill. L. Rev. 88.
2 321 Ii. App. 457,. 53 N. E. (2d) 302 (1944).
The court held that inadvertent
use of an appeal instead of a writ of error would not defeat jurisdiction in view of
Rule 28 of the Illinois Supreme Court: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 259.28.
a The rule was first laid down in Meyers v. Meyers, 32 Ill. App. 189 (1889), on
analogy with cases involving the appointment of a guardian for a minor, c.f.
Cramer v. Forbis, 31 Ill. App. 259 (1889), and a finding of insanity, c.f. People
ex rel. Fullerton v. Gilbert, 115 Ill. 59, 3 N. E. 744 (1885).
Subsequent cases in
accord are: In re Warner's Petition, 193 Il1. App. 382 (1915) ; Holman v. Brown,.
215 Ill. App. 247 (1919), where writ of error was held improper; Dixon v. Haslett,
232 Ill. App. 152 (1924).
Appeal from an order denying a petition to vacate a
decree of adoption was dismissed in Moore v. Brandt, 234 Ill. App. 306 (1924).
4 Statutory requirement that the parents be made parties was first added in 1907.
See Laws 1907, p. 3.
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habeas corpus. The unfortunate result of such holdings was
that the natural parent could assert a right to custody of the
adopted child only if it could be shown that the court in which
adoption was decreed was entirely lacking in jurisdiction so
as to make the decree a nullity.' If jurisdiction was present
but the order was based on an erroneous finding, no review
was available.7
Support for so narrow a view was said to rest in the fact
that adoption proceedings were unknown to the common law,
did not belong to the general jurisdiction of county courts,
and existed, if at all, only by reason of special statutes establishing a special and summary manner of procedure.' Unless
appeal was expressly provided for therein, no review in that
fashion was deemed possible.
While it is no doubt true that adoption proceedings are
purely the creature of statute and formed no part of the common law,9 it was thought that a way for obtaining appellate
review of adoption decrees had been opened by the holding of
the Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case of Superior Coal
Company v. O'Brien. ° That case declared that review of
purely statutory proceedings was possible by writ of error
where no other method of review was provided and the use of
writ of error was not expressly forbidden, since the last
named form of review was said to be a matter of right.
Application of that rule to the instant problem was rejected, in the Ekendahl case, on the ground that such a writ
may only be used where (1) some property right is affected,
or (2) personal liberty is involved. No question over the per5 Sullivan v. People, 224 Ill. 468, 79 N. E. 695 (1906).
6 In People ex rel. Witton v. Harriss, 307 Ill. App. 283, 30 N. E. (2d) 169 (1940),
the court said:

". . . the sole inquiry to be made . . . is whether the county court

had jurisdiction to render the order ..
"
7 The Appellate Court, in People ex rel. O'Connor v. Cole, 238 Ill. App. 413 at 423
(1925), made a trenchant comment on this point when it stated: "It is hardly to
be thought that the legislature would provide a procedure by which, without the
right of trial by jury and without the right to a review of the evidence by a higher
court, a parent could, as against his will, have his child taken from him and given
to another." The comment appears to have passed unnoticed.
8 In re Warner's Petition, 193 Ill. App. 382 (1915), elaborates on this point.
9 An ancient and curious case, which might indicate that the contrary is true, is
discussed at length in Zane, A Mediaeval Cause Celebre, 1 Ill. L. Rev. 363 (1907).
10383 Ill. 394, 50 N. E. (2d) 453 (1943), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVMW.
33.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADOPTION DECREES

sonal liberty of the natural parent is concerned in an adoption
proceeding, hence the writ could not be sought by the parent
on that ground. Whether or not some property interest is
involved is, however, a debatable question. On that score,
the Illinois Supreme Court flatly rejected any such possibility
by saying: "There is nothing in the nature of the right which
natural parents have in their children and to their custody
that will support a review of an adoption proceeding by writ
of error."" Mere contingent possibilities that property rights
might be affected were said to be insufficient to justify the use
of such a writ. In that regard, it might be said that in
Holman v. Brown 2 a writ of error was dismissed because no
contention had been made that any property right had been
affected by the decree of adoption. Attempt was subsequently
made, in Dixon v. Haslett" to distinguish the case from the
Holman decision on the ground that property rights were
there involved. On this point the court said: "The foundation of the argument that property rights are involved is that
the children will inherit from their adoptive parents and their
adoptive parents will inherit from them."' 4 That argument
was refuted by the court when it found that no present property right was concerned since the heir apparent might not
live to inherit, or, living to the time to inherit, might be cut
off by will.
The only other possibility that a "property" right might
be affected by the adoption proceeding would seem to lie in
the fact that a parent, if entitled to custody, is entitled to the
child's earnings and, in case injury is done to the child affecting that earning capacity, to a cause of action in his own right
against the wrongdoer to recover damages." - True, in the
case of most minors, such right is more nebulous than real,
but it must be a right in esse to ripen into a cause of action
if invaded. Such interests, while not encompassed within any
narrow definition of property, could have satisfied the requirement that some property right be affected so as to warrant
11 388
12 215
13 232
14 232

Ill. 412 at 415, 58 N. E. (2d) 585 at 587.
I1. App. 257 (1919).
I1. App. 152 (1924).
Ill. App. 152 at 154-5.
15 Kerr v. Forgue, 54 Ill. 482 (1870).
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the use of a writ of error had the Illinois Supreme Court seen
fit to give liberal treatment to the problem before it in the
Ekendahl case.'" The narrow attitude displayed, probably
out of respect to the idea that statutes in derogation of the
-common law are to be confined as much as possible, is, however, in direct contrast to the liberality usually displayed by
that court in cases affecting the welfare of children.
Whatever the reason may be, judicial review of adoption
proceedings in this state can now only be obtained if the legislature sees fit to amend the present statute. 7 Mere deletion
of the restriction therein against reliance upon the appellate
provisions of the Civil Practice Act will not accomplish the
purpose of providing adequate review of adoption decrees. If,
therefore, the legislature is concerned in remedying what
would appear to anyone to be an obvious defect in the law,
serious consideration should be given to the problem as well
as to proposals already made for its rectification." Some form
of statute ought to be adopted for it is unthinkable, in this
day and age, that a parent, no matter how callous, should be
deprived of the custody of his child and his parental ties destroyed, without relief from his parental obligations, 9 unless
some review before a higher court of the evidence supporting
such action is granted.
Before considering the specific proposals pending in the
Illinois legislature, it might prove worthwhile to examine the
state of the law as it exists in the other American jurisdic16 Illustrative of the liberal treatment accorded in some states is the case of
Appeal of Cummings, 126 Me. 111, 136 A. '662 (1927), where statutory review,
granted to a "person aggrieved," was permitted to the natural parent, although such
parent was said not to have any tangible, valuable or enforcible property rights,
because the decree deprived the parent of the status of heir presumptive of the
child being adopted which was treated as enough of an interest to support proceedings to review.
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 4, § 13, currently declares that the provisions of the
Civil Act shall apply to adoption proceedings "except as to any provision for appeal
and except as otherwise provided in this Act."
is Following the decision in the Ekendahl case, measures were introduced in the
64th General Assembly by Representative Edwards, H. B. 219 and H. B. 220; by
Senator Daley, S. B. 207; and by Senator Baker, S. B. 226. A companion bill to
S. B. 226 was introduced in the House by Representatives O'Grady and Strausky:
See H. B. 356. They will be discussed at greater length hereafter in this article.
The proposals of Representative Edwards have passed the House, and are pending
in the Senate Committee on Judiciary at the time of writing, while the Senate
bills have not yet been enacted by that body.
19 See note to Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10 N. E. (2d) 344 (1937), in 16
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 198.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADOPTION DECREES

tions. As late as 1936, an eminent compiler of American statutes dealing with the family relationship, when writing on
this point, stated: "The statutes of ten jurisdictions expressly
provide for an appeal. Where such provisions are not found,
an appeal may no doubt be taken, ordinarily, under general
Since that time, nine other states have enacted
statutes."2
statutory provisions, to a total of nineteen, 2 but the diversity
in the language thereof is noteworthy. The suggestion that
reliance may be placed on general statutes covering appeals
in other civil causes, however, does not appear to be generally
supported by decisions for in those states without express
statutory enactment only three have recognized a clear right
to some form of review, 22 three- others have seemingly permitted review without inquiry over the point,28 while four
others, including Illinois, have flatly rejected the possiblity. 24
The remaining twenty states and the District of Columbia
have neither statute nor judicial decision bearing on the point.
When analysis is made of the existing statutes, it would
20 Vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. IV, p. 297.
21The most recent check discloses statutes in the following jurisdictions:
Arizona, Code Anno. 1939, Vol. II, Ch. 27, § 27-209; Florida, Laws 1943, Vol. I, p.
187, § 17; Kansas, G. S. 1943 Supp., Probate Code, Art. 59-2401; Kentucky, Rev.
Stat. 1944, p. 2762, § 405.220; Louisiana, Dart La. Gen. Stat. 1939, Vol. III,
§ 4839.37; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, COh.80, § 39; Massachusetts, Ann. Laws., Vol. VI,
Ch. 210, § 11; Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1939, Vol. II, § 9611; Montana, Laws 1941, p.
187, amending Rev. Code 1935, Vol. III, Ch. 9, § 5859; Nebraska, Rev. Stat. 1943,
Vol. III, § 43-112; North Carolina, Gen. Stat. 1943, Vol. II, § 48-5; Oregon, Comp.
Laws Ann., Vol. V, § 63-409; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 420, § 8, supplemented by Acts and Resolves, 1940, p. 608; South Carolina, Code 1942, Vol. I,
§ 255 (20); South Dakota, Code 1939, Vol. I, § 14.0405, and Vol. II, § 35.2102;
Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, § 3334; Washington, Laws 1934, Ch. 268, § 11, p. 831;
West Virginia, Code 1943, § 4760; Wisconsin, Stats. 1943, § 324.01 and §324.02.
22 Arkansas permits appeal by one who is a party to the proceeding: Fries v.
Phillips, 189 Ark. 712, 74 S. W. (2d) 961 (1934), but denies It to one not a party:
Deffenbaugh v. Roden, 182 Ark. 348, 31 S. W. (2d) 406 (1930). Limited review
by certiorari Is permitted in North Dakota: Nelson v. Ecklund, 68 N. D. 724, 283
N. W. 273 (1938), but an appeal was dismissed on the court's own motion in In re
Mair, 61 N. D. 256, 237 N. W. 756 (1931). In Pennsylvania, review to the extent
possible under certiorari was permitted in Appeal of Weinbach, 316 Pa. 333, 175
A. 500 (1934). See also In re Young, 259 Pa. 573, 103 A. 344 (1918).
23 Criswell v. Jones, 3 S. E. (2d) (Ga. App.) 115 (1939) ; Vaughan v. Hubbard,
38 Ida. 451, 221 P. 1107 (1923); Waller v. Ellis, 169 Md. 15, 179 A. 289 (1935).
24 In re Palmer's Adoption, 129 Fla. 630, 196 So. 537 (1937) ; Leonard v. Honisfarger, 43 Ind. App. 607, 88 N. E. 91 (1909), followed in Shirley v. Grove, 51 Ind.
App. 17, 98 N. E. 874 (1912), and Freeland v. Weed, 75 Ind. App. 273, 128 N. N.
656 (1920); In re Hughes, 88 Okla. 257, 213 P. 79 (1923). The effect of the
Florida decision was subsequently nullified by Fla. Laws 1943, Vol. I, p. 187,. § 17.
The Oklahoma case cited indicated that adoption, in that state, was essentially a
matter of contract rather than a judicial proceeding although it required the sanetion of a judicial officer for its consummation. The court therein also suggested
that California might be in the same category. The Illinois cases are listed in
footnotes 1 and 3, ante.
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seem that in no single instance has the problem of the right
of appeal been thoroughly examined. In some, careful attention has been given to one or more of the following subordinate elements, to-wit: (1) who should be permitted to appeal,
(2) when and how appeal should be taken, (3) should an appeal bond be necessary, (4) ought costs for an unsuccessful
appeal be imposed, (5) should the appeal be limited to cases
where a decree of adoption has been entered and denied in
case the petition to adopt is rejected, (6) ought appeal be permitted in case the adoption decree is subsequently vacated on
petition, and (7) what disposition should be made of the
custody of the minor pending appeal; but no one measure encompasses all points. A comparison of the several statutes,
with critical comment on their provisions, should possess
some value.
With respect to the first point, i. e. who should be entitled
to appeal, the widest dissimilarity is present. Under the
Kansas statute, for example, the right of appeal is assimilated
to appeals in other civil cases,2" while in Arizona a broad class
of persons entitled to appeal is expressly named.26 The phrase
most frequently found in use in such statutes indicates that
"any party [person] aggrieved" may appeal.27 The term
"party," of course, would seem to limit the right of appeal
only to those litigants actually concerned in the proceeding,2"
while the looser term "person" might extend to one not
named therein.2 9 When the expression is qualified by the adjective "aggrieved," still further uncertainty is introduced.
In order to be "aggrieved," the individual must usually show
that the decree or judgment operates on his property or bears
directly upon his interests."
Such might be the case in the
25 Kansas, G. S. 1943 Supp., Probate Code, Art. 59-2401, merely states an appeal
may be taken without saying by whom.
26 See Arizona, Code Anno. 1939, Vol. II. Ch. 27, § 27-209.
27 In Florida, Laws 1943, Vol. I, p. 187, § 17, and South Dakota, Code 1939, Vol.
II, § 35.2102, the word "party" appears. In Kentucky, Rev. Stat. 1944, p. 2762,
§ 405.220, and Wisconsin, Stats. 1943, § 324.01, the term "person" has been substituted for "party."
28 Such was the holding in Fries v. Phillips, 189 Ark. 712, 74 S. W. (2d) 961
(1934), in the absence of statute. H. B. 219, § 11, uses the term "party to the
proceeding."
29 There are no decisions on this point, but the term "person" is used in S. B.
226, § 7-2, instead of "party."
30 See comment in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 94 on the use of this term in
connection with appeals from decisions in probate matters.
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event the appellant was either the minor or the petitioner, but,
in the light of the attitude displayed by the Illinois Supreme
Court in the Ekendahl case, the term "aggrieved" could
hardly be said to extend to the natural parent." Use of such
phrase to describe the persons entitled to appeal is not desirable,32 particularly if the objective sought is one permitting
appeal by the natural parent.
Somewhat similar phraseology appears in other statutes.
In Vermont and West Virginia, the right is confined to "any
person interested, '13 which is closely parallel to that given by
the Louisiana statute to "any party in interest," 4 but no interpretation of the essential "interest" has been provided by
judicial decision. The North Carolina statute permits appeal
by a "party to.. . adoption proceedings,"3 but is defective in
that the appeal can only be taken by such person from a "completed and final adoption," hence is not broad enough to include an unsuccessful petitioner. In Washington, the statute,
at least by implication, extends the right of appeal to "parties
.. . and those notified as herein provided,"3 6 but no reason
appears for the latter expression since it would seem that if
one is entitled to notice he should be a "party." The Missouri
statute is at least more logical for it confines the right to
appeal to a person who should consent to the adoption but
does not. 7 Although that phraseology would seem to be
inapplicable to the petitioner, it has been held in that state
that the successful petitioner may appeal, under another statute permitting appeals from orders granting new trials, if the
adoption decree is subsequently vacated."
Specific description of the person entitled to appeal is con-

s1 It

was held broad enough, for this purpose, in Appeal of Cummings, 126 Me.

111, 136 A. 662 (1927).
32 S. B. 226, § 7-2, and its companion, I. B. 356, uses the phrase "any person
wvho considers himself aggrieved." Italics added. The use of a subjective rather

than an objective test is not deemed suitable in legal proceedings.
33 Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, § 3334, and West Virginia, Code 1943, §4760.
34 Dart Gen. Stat. 1939, Vol. III, § 4839.37.
35 North Carolina, Gen. Stats. 1943, Vol. II, § 48-5.
36 Washington, Laws 1943, Ch. 268, § 11.
37 Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1939, Vol. II, § 9611.
Further
38 In re Zartman's Adoption, 334 Mo. 237, 65 S. W. (2d) 951 (1933).
enlargement appears to have been permitted in the case of In re Hickman, 170
S. W. (2d) (Mo. App.) 695 (1943), where petitioner successfully appealed from
an order denying the petition. No question was presented, however, as to the right
to maintain such an appeal.
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tained in other statutes, but again wide dissimilarity is apparent. Under the South Carolina statute, for example, appeal
is limited to the "parent or, in case there be no parent, by the
guardian, custodian or next friend."3 9 Clearly the disappointed petitioner would not fall in this category, but it is not
clear whether the parent could proceed in his own right or
must seek review on behalf of the child. The Montana statute
seems equally confined for the phrase there-used would seem
to limit the right of appeal to parent who had been made a
party to the proceeding. ° Even more limited is the Massachusetts statute which restricts appeal to "a parent, who upon
a petition for adoption, had no personal notice of the proceedings before the decree." 41 More elaborate would seem the.
language in the Nebraska statute which authorizes an appeal
"by any person against whom such order, judgment or decree
may be made, or who may be affected thereby,"42 but in the
last analysis such cumbersome language would seem to boil
down so as to be' the equivalent of "any person aggrieved."
In three of the statutes, those found in Maine, Oregon and
Rhode Island, the class of persons who may appeal is limited
to (a) the petitioner. and (b) the adopted child acting
through a next friend." Unless the natural parent proceeds
as a next friend, therefore, the parent's appeal from the adoption decree will be dismissed according to the holding the case
of Moore v. Phillips." Certainly, if the natural parent's feelings in the matter are to be consulted, no such circumscrip39 South Carolina, Code 1942, Vol. I, § 255(20).
40 Montana, Laws 1941, p. 187, amending Rev. Code 1935, Vol. III. Ch. 9, § 5859.

Prior thereto, a writ of review was permitted to a parent who had not been notified
on the ground that while a writ of habeas corpus could test the validity of the
adoption it was not adequate: State ex rel. Thompson v. District Court, 75 Mont.
147, 242 P. 959 (1926).
41 Mass., Ann. Laws, Vol. VI, Ch. 210, § 11. The extreme nature of the limitation
on the right to review is illustrated by Hurley v. St. Martin, 283 Mass. 415, 186
N. E. 596 (1938), wherein the natural mother was denied review because she had
not sustained the burden of proving that her petition to vacate, made necessary
by the statute, was filed "within one year after actual notice" of the decree.
42 Nebraska, Rev. Stat. 1943, Vol. III, § 43-112. There is dicta in In re Zehner's
Estate, 130 Neb. 375, 264 N. W. 891 (1936), to the effect that the natural heir of
the adoptive parent would have no appealable interest.
43 Compare Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, Ch. 80, § 39, with Oregon, Comp. Laws Ann.,
Vol. V, § 63-409, and Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 420, § 8.
The natural parent, in Appeal of Cummings, 126
44 94 Me. 421, 47 A. 913 (1900).
Me. 111, 136 A. 662 (1927), was allowed to conduct an appeal under another
statute, Rev. Stat. 1930, Ch. 67, § 31, permitting "any person aggrieved by any
order" to appeal from the same. The court rejected a similar contention, in Moore
v. Phillips, since other provisions of that statute were not satisfied therein.
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tion should be placed 'in the appeal provision. Still more
elaborate is the Vermont statute under which the "parent,
grand-parent, guardian or husband" of an adopted minor may
seek to have the adoption decree vacated. The decision on
such petition may be reviewed by "a party interested,"45 so
presumably all of the persons named as well as the formerly
successful adopting parent whose decree is vacated might
obtain review. The minor himself, however, would seem to
be without remedy in the premises except as some slight relief
is furnished by a provision, enacted, in 1941, under which the
minor, within one ,year after attaining majority, may file a
dissent from such adoption.
Most elaborate of all, is the
Arizona provision which grants a right of review to the "petitioner, parent, guardian or other person having the custody
of the child," and the child itself "by next friend."47 Unfortunately, that statute contains the qualification that the
appeal may run only "from a decree of adoption," with the
consequent result that appeal from an order denying a petition to adopt was held improper in Sargent v. Superior
Court." If any conclusion is to be drawn from this analysis
as to the persons who should be permitted to appeal, then it
could only be one to the effect that careful thought is necessary to fix and name the class in question.
The time and manner of taking the appeal, where permitted, is customarily handled in the same fashion as is true
of civil cases generally. There would seem to be no reason
why any different regulation should be imposed in adoption
cases, particularly where the parties are before the court or
have been personally served with notice of the pendency of
the proceedings. For that reason, the adoption decree usually
becomes final as to such persons at the expiration of thirty
days after the entry thereof. 9 In some instances the appeal
procedure merely contemplates a hearing de novo in the next
Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, § 3334.
46 Vermont, Pub. Laws 1941, p. 61.
47 Arizona, Code Anno. 1939, Vol. II, Ch. 27, § 27-209.
48 28 Ariz. 605, 238 P. 387 (1925).
In the case of In re Clark's Adoption, 38 Ariz.
461, 1 P. (2d) 112 (1931), the court Indicated, without discussing the point here
concerned, that denial of a petition to adopt would not be disturbed on appeal
"without a showing of a very grave abuse of discretion."
49 Compare Washington, Laws 1943, Ch. 268, § 11, with S. B. 226, § 7-2.
45
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highest court,"° but in other statutes the nature of the review
intended is clearly that customarily provided by appellate
tribunals."
Where the court hearing the adoption proceeding in the first instance is a court of record, and particularly
where the evidence in the proceeding is preserved in the
record,5 2 it would seem that appellate review rather than trial
de novo should suffice. The bills now pending in the Illinois
legislature, at least, are drawn along the line of providing for
appellate review only. 5
A common provision found in statutes regulating the
right of appeal requires the appellant to post a bond for costs,
or an even more substantial bond in case the appeal is to
operate as a supersedeas 4 There would seem to be no occasion for changing this requirement in adoption cases, except
in one particular, so most of the statutes permitting appealdirect that the same shall be taken "in manner and form provided for appeals in civil actions." 5 The exception referred
to becomes of grave concern in case the appellant is the minor,
frequently one who has been adopted at a time when his
wishes in the matter could not be ascertained because of his
immaturity. Such person would be unable to procure bond
while the onus of incurring expense in the minor's behalf,
with the risk of suffering judgment for costs, should not be
thrust on his next friend. Only four of the statutes analyzed
seem to give consideration to this problem, but they do provide that no bond shall be required of, or costs awarded
50 See, for example, Kansas. G. S. 1943 Supp., Probate Code, Art. 59-2401; Kentucky, Rev. Stat. 1944, p. 2762, § 405.220; Nebraska, Rev. Stat. 1943, Vol. III,
§ 43-112; Oregon. Comp. Laws Ann., Vol. V, § 63-409; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws
1938, Ch. 420, § 8; South Carolina, Code 1942, Vol. I, § 255(20) ; West Virginia,
Code 1943, § 4760.
51 See Arizona. Code Anno. 1939, Vol. II, Ch. 27. § 27-209; Louisiana, Dart Gen.
Stat. 1939, Vol. III, § 4839.37; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, Ch. SO, § 39; Massachusetts,
Ann. Laws 1933, Vol. VI, Ch. 210. § 11.
52 On that point, attention is invited to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110 § 1S8 (3),
which directs that no certificate of evidence is necessary to support the decree "in
any case in equity." See also Eiek v. Eick, 277 Ill. App. 329 (1934).
53 H. B. 219 provides that appeals from the final order or judgment shall be
taken "to the Appellate Court for the proper district, in the method and manner
provided by the Civil Practice Act in other cases." As the Appellate Court is a
court of limited jurisdiction, a companion measure, H. B. 220, seeks to enlarge the
jurisdiction of that court by suitable amendment to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, § 32.
54 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 206.
55 That phrase, or comparable language, appears in at least twelve of the statutes. The same thought appears carried over into H. B. 219, S. B. 207 and S. B.
226.
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against, the minor or his next friend. 6 To require the minor
to wait until attaining his majority before permitting him to

act to rescind a decree of adoption, as is done in some states, 7
affords no reasonable solution to this problem for irreparable
damage to the minor's interests might be done in the mean-

time. The oversight on the part of most of the legislatures is
one that calls for attention.
In several instances, the adoption statutes would seem to
limit the right of appeal to cases wherein adoption has been
decreed."5 So far as the natural parent is concerned, there
would be no occasion to seek review if the contested petition to
adopt was denied since the parent's rights would in no way
be disturbed and any question of custodial rights could be
dealt with through habeas corpus proceedings. Ordinary fairness, however, would seem to indicate that if the natural
parent is to be entitled to seek review, so too should the disappointed petitioner whose request for adoption has been
denied. Where the right is granted to "any person aggrieved,"

that phraseology might be construed sufficiently broad to permit review at the request of the petitioner but there are decisions to the contrary."
If it is intended that the petitioner
should have the right to seek review from an adverse order,

clarity of expression would dictate naming him as a person
entitled to the benefit of the statutory provision.".
56 See Arizona, Code Anno. 1939, Vol. II,Ch. 27, § 27-209; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930,
Ch. 80, § 39; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 420, § 8; Wisconsin, Stats. 1943,
§ 324.02. The proposed measures in Illinois are silent on this point.
57 Vermont, Laws 1941, p. 61; West Virginia, Code 1943, § 4760.
56 Arizona, Code Anno. 1939, Vol. II, Ch. 27, § 27-209; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, Ch.
80, § 39; Massachusetts, Ann. Laws 1933, Vol. VI, Ch. 210; § 11; Missouri, Rev.
Stat. 1939, Vol. II, § 9611; Montana, Laws 1941, p. 187; North Carolina, Gen.
Stats. 1943, Vol. II, § 48-5; Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, § 3334. The wording of
Kentucky, Rev. Stat. 1944, p. 2762, § 405.220, is ambiguous for while it purports to
permit appeal by any person aggrieved, it declares that: "The appeal of any
minor from an order of adoption may be taken by any person on his behalf or by
guardian ad litem." Italics added.
z9 Compare Sargent v. Superior Court, 28 Ariz. 605, 238 P. 387 (1925), with In re
Hickman, 170 S. W. (2d) (Mo. App.) 695 (1943), decided under a statute which
apparently limited appeal to a non-consenting parent.
60 See Kansas, G. S. 1943 Supp., Probate Code, Art. 59-2401; Oregon, Comp. Laws
Ann., Vol. V, § 63-409, applied in In re Flora's Adoption, 152 Ore. 155, 52 P. 178
(1935); Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 420, § 8; Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933,
§ 3334; Washington, Laws 1943, Ch. 268, § 11. Proposed H. B. 219 uses the expression "any party to the proceeding" which might be construed to be sufficient
to permit appeal by the petitioner. S. B. 207, on the other hand, is open to criticism on this point for proposed Section 10a specifically grants a right of appeal
to "a natural parent who was a defendant in an adoption proceeding hereunder and
who was deprived of the custody of his child" and then purports to make appli-
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Of equal concern should be the question of the right of
the natural parent or other similar person, who was not notified personally and who did not participate in the proceeding,
to make application to vacate any decree based upon publication either (a) within a reasonable time after the entry thereof,
or (b) within a specified period after actual notice of such
decree. A substantial number of adoption decrees are based
on service by publication, sometimes addressed to interested
persons by the description of "all whom it may concern,"'" so
that the absent parent might not learn of the decree in time to
seek appeal under ordinary rules."- The former Chancery Act
of this state gave any person notified by publication an absolute right to have a decree in equity vacated upon request
made within one year from the date thereof.6
That provision
was repealed at the time of the enactment of the Civil Practice
Act, and in lieu thereof the present statute authorizes a petition within one year after such decree upon which, after hearing, the court may set the decree aside or alter or amend the
same "if it shall appear that such decree ought not to have
been made against such defendant."64 There is doubt that
such statute would have
application to adoption proceedings
since it commences with the words "when any final decree
in chancery shall be entered," and would seem to be limited
in application. It could scarcely be contended that adoption
proceedings fit that category, but assuming that such section
did apply, there is a vast difference between the right to have
a decree vacated and the mere possibility of being able to convince the court that "such decree ought not to have been
made," as the latter contemplates some exercise of discretion
on the part of the trial court. Should the petitioner be successful, there is still left undetermined the question of the
right of the adopting parent to seek review of an order vacating the decree. In one state, a provision of limited nature permits direct appeal from the decree itself by the natural parent
cable the general provisions of the Civil Practice Act, "including the provisions
for appeal." The particular grant of the right to appeal might be held to overrule the general one. S. B. 226 is likewise vague in describing the appellant as
"any person who considers himself aggrieved."
61 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 4, § 2.
62 The Washington statute limits the time for appeal to thirty days after entry
of the decree': Washington, Laws 1943, Ch. 268, § 11.
63 Cahill, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 22, § 19.
64 111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174(8).
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without preliminary petition to vacate the same.65 Only in
Vermont,6 6 Washington 7 and West Virginia," however, has
the problem been given serious consideration, and only the
Washington statute expressly recognizes the right of the
adoping parent to seek review of an order vacating the adoption decree. Under the circumstances, it would seem that
any statutory provision for review should be reasonably
explicit on these points. 9
When denying the right to an appeal in insanity proceedings,7 0 the Illinois Supreme Court once expressed concern
that to permit the taking of an appeal "would suspend the
proceeding and leave the insane person at large until the
appeal.., could be decided."'" Much the same concern might
have been in the mind of the first Illinois court asked to determine whether appeal was possible in adoption matters, for it
cited that case in support of its holding denying such right.
Certainly, no minor should "be left at large" until the appeal
could be decided, but it does not follow that provision could
not be made for the minor's custody pending the appeal. In
only one instance, however, does it appear that any legislature
has given thought to this problem and then, apparently, only
as an afterthought. An addition to the Rhode Island statute,
enacted in 1940, states: "During the pendency of such appeal
the superior court shall have jurisdiction with respect to the
custody of such child and shall make such orders as may be
for the best interest of such child. This jurisdiction shall continue after verdict or decision until the final determination of
the appeal."7 2 A similar provision could be inserted in any
proposed amendment to the Illinois act and the custody of the
minor pending, appeal could well be left to the discretion of
the trial judge, thereby obviating a potential objection to
granting appeal in such cases.
65 See
Massachusetts, Ann. Laws 1933, Vol. VI, Ch. 210, § 11. but consider
Hurley v. St. Martin, 283 Mass. 415, 186 N. E. 596 (1933), in connection therewith.
66 Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, § 3334, fixes a one-year limitation.
67 Washington, Laws 1943, Ch. 268, § 11, permits application within six months
from decree.
68 West Virginia, Code 1943, § 4760.
69 None of the Illinois proposals, except by inference which might be drawn from
reference to the applicability of the Civil' Practice Act, touch on this point. Assumption that the Civil Practice Act covers the situation is unwarranted.
70 Such right has since been granted: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 912, § 24.
71 People ex rel. Fullerton v. Gilbert, 115 Ill. 59 at 61, 3 N. E. 744 at 745 (1885).
72 Rhode Island, Acts and Resolves 1940, p. 608.
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Tested in the light of these suggestions, the proposed
amendments to the Illinois act would all appear to be inadequate. House Bill 219 proposes to eliminate the qualification
on the language which makes the Civil Practice Act applicable to adoption proceedings by deleting the words "except as
to any provisions for appeal and" as they now appear in Section 11 of the Adoption Act. That is the first essential step.
But that bill then proposes to add the following: "Any party
to the proceedings may appeal from the final order or judgment of the Court to the Appellate Court for the proper district, in the method and manner provided by the Civil Practice Act in other cases." Such language would seem sufficiently broad to permit appeal by either the petitioner, the
parent, or the minor from decrees of adoption or orders denying the prayer of the petition. The time and manner of taking appeal can be determined by reference to other statutory
provisions, but the quoted language would appear to be insufficient to settle the other problems which will be apt to arise
upon proceedings to review unless some amplification is made.
The companion bill, House Bill 220, is essential in order to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. Care must be
taken, however, to avoid the situation of conferring jurisdiction of appeals taken under an act which might, at the same
session, be repealed.7 3
Proposed Senate Bill 207 is designed to add a new section
to the present statute. That section, designated Section 10a,
would read:
A natural parent who was a defendant in an adoption proceeding
hereunder and who was deprived of the custody of his child by the
decree entered in such proceeding may appeal to the Appellate Court
for a review of all questions of law and fact presented by the record.

It is followed by a slight modification of Section 11 under
which the words "except as to any" would be deleted and the
word "including" substituted in place thereof so as to make
the Civil Practice Act "including the provisions for appeal"
cover adoption proceedings. The scope of review permitted
73 S. B. 226 proposes to repeal the act of Feb. 27, 1874, as amended, and to substitute an entirely new statute in its place. The language of H. B. 220 would be
nullified if such measure were passed unless suitable amendment was made
therein.
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by proposed Section 10a is obviously very narrow, but conflict
is engendered with the subsequent change which purports to
throw the door wide open. One significant thing should be
noticed, and that is the fact that proposed Section 10a would
permit review "of all questions of law and fact presented by
the record." It would be unfortunate if appellate review were
to be limited merely to questions of law, for the most seriously
disputed question before the trial court, in adoption cases, is
the one over the point of whether or not the natural parent is
so far at fault as to warrant taking the child from under his
custody and placing it with another.
More comprehensive is the change proposed by Senate
Bill 226 which would repeal the existing statute and substitute a new adoption act in place thereof. There is no occasion,
here at least, to comment on all of its provisions, 7 4 but the section regarding the question of review is worthy of attention.
That section now reads:
Sec. 7-2. Appeals from the final orders or judgments of the County
Court or the Circuit Court, made and entered in proceedings under
this Act, may be taken, by any person who considers himself aggrieved, to the Appellate Court of this State, in the same manner as
in other civil cases in courts of record, provided, that no appeal may
be taken more than thirty days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from.

Two points should be noted, to-wit: (1) the 'appellant may be
"any person who considers himself aggrieved," and (2) the
time for taking the appeal is limited to "thirty days after the
entry of the order or judgment appealed from." The ambiguity concerning the person who might appeal would doubtless
require judicial construction. The short period permitted in
which the appeal might be taken would not be objectionable
as applied to one who had been personally served and was
present in court, but it seems unreasonably short as applied
to one presumably notified by publication, particularly if the
notice was not, in fact, received.
74 As introduced, that statute, like the present one, makes no specific reference to
the consequences of adoption as between the child and the adopting parents, nor
does it purport to change the rule laid down in Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10
N. E. (2d) 344 (1937), noted in 16 CHICAGO-KENT REvIEW 198, with respect to the
duty owed to the child by the natural parents after adoption has taken place.
S. B. 226 is also silent on the right of the adopting parents to seek to vacate the
decree in case the adopted child should subsequently, within a reasonable period,
be discovered to be insane, feeble-minded or the like.
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As none of the proposed amendments would seem sufficient to meet the needs of the situation produced by the decision in the Ekendahl case, a proposed statute is here prese-nted for congideration. Such statute is admittedly lengthy,
but it purports to cover all of the problems noted above. It
may be substituted for Section 11 of the present act, or, with
suitable modification, might be inserted in place of Section 7-2
of the contemplated new statute on the subject. A companion
bill enlarging the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court, similar
to House Bill 220, would be required to provide complete coverage. The text of the appeal provision should be substantially
as follows:
The provisions of the Civil Practice Act and all existing and future
amendments of said Act and modifications thereof, and the rules now
or hereafter adopted pursuant to said Act, shall apply to all proceedings hereunder, except as otherwise provided in this Act. No matters
not germane to the distinctive purpose of this proceeding shall be
introduced by joinder, counterclaim or otherwise. 75
Any petitioner, parent, guardian or other person having the custody
of a child, 76 may appeal from the final order or judgment of the
Court 77 to the Appellate Court for the proper district, in the method
and manner provided by the Civil Practice Act in other civil cases
in courts of record, for a review of all questions of law and fact presented by the record, provided, that no appeal may be taken more
than thirty days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed
from;78 and the child adopted may, by next friend, appeal in like
manner, but no bond shall be required of or costs awarded against
such child or next friend on an appeal from an order of adoption. 7 9
During the pendency of any such appeal, the court in which the
adoption proceedings were instituted shall have jurisdiction with
respect to the custody of the child and shall make such orders as
75

The first paragraph is taken from the present statute with the words "except

as to any provisions for appeal and" deleted.

768The class of persons names is borrowed from Arizona, Code Anno. 1939, Vol II,
Ch. 27, § 27-209.
77 The words "final order or judgment" are to be preferred over "decree of adoption," so as to permit appeal by either side.
78 A fixed time limitation would seem desirable to avoid the possibility of both a
"short" appeal and a "long" appeal permitted under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110,
§ 200.
79 This clause is substantially similar to Arizona, Code Anno. 1939, Vol. II, Ch.
27, § 27-209. It should be noticed that the qualification that no bond shall be required of or costs awarded against the minor is confined to appeals from "an order
of adoption." The minor would scarcely need to seek relief except from such a
decree. If, therefore, the minor or his next friend wishes to appeak from any
other final order, he should be prepared to bear the onus of an unsuccessful appeal.
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may be for the best interests of the child, which jurisdiction shall
continue until the final determination of the appeal.8 0
If notice of the pendency of adoption proceedings be given to any
person by publication in the manner herein provided,"' and such person shall fail to appear or participate in such proceedings, any such
person may, prior to the expiration of twelve months from the entry
of any final decree. of adoption,s2 file in the court in which such adoption proceedings were instituted his verified petition for the vacation
or modification of the final decree alleging the grounds, if any he has,
for such action.8 3 Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall,
upon application, fix a time for hearing thereon and shall require the
petitioner to give not less than ten days' notice, in writing, to all of
the parties to the adoption proceeding of the date set for such hearing. The court may permit such parties to answer such petition. If,
upon the hearing upon said petition, it shall appear that such decree
ought not to have been made, the same may be set aside, altered or
amended as shall appear just; otherwise such petition shall be dismissed at petitioner's costs.8

4

An appeal from any order vacating,

altering or amending such decree or dismissing the petition, may be
taken in the manner and within the time hereinabove set forth.8 5
If no appeal be taken or if no petition to vacate be filed, within the
time hereby permitted, then any decree of adoption granted hereunder
shall be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to attack either
directly or collaterally.8 6

If such a statute were enacted, it could well be contended
that Illinois recognizes the wisdom of permitting appeals in
adoption cases and has made adequate provision to see that
justice is done to all concerned therein.
80 This sentence, with suitable modification, is borrowed from Rhode Island, Acts
and Resolves 1940, p. 608.
81 Service by publication in certain cases is permitted by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943,
Ch. 4, § 2, and is contemplated under S. B. 226, § 2-2.
82 Any reasonable period of time might be substituted, but it is thought that the
same amount of time should be allowed as is granted in cases of decrees in chancery based on publication under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174(8), so that the
practice might be substantially iimilar. That statute fixes the time period at
"within one year after such decree."
83 The requirement that the petitioner shall advance "the grounds, if any he has,
for such action," borrowed from Washington, Laws 1943, Ch. 268, § 11, is inserted
to indicate that the petitioner is not entitled to have the decree vacated as a matter of absolute right.
84 The procedure subsequent to filing the petition is substantially similar to that
laid down in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174(8).
85 A discussion of the need for this provision is given above: footnotes 61 to 69,
ante.
86 This idea is borrowed from Washington, Laws 1943, Ch. 268, § 11.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
"THE

DECISION .

. . WILL BE FINAL !"

The dulcet tones of the radio announcer have oft proclaimed,
"The decision of the judges will be final !" Emphasis so laid on finality
may evoke a random thought in the mind of the average listener but
to the legal mind, inured to the mutability of judicial pronouncements, those words possess a hollow ring. And, judging by the recent
case of Groves v. Carolene Products Company,' they have engendered
a controversy unique in the annals of Illinois jurisprudence.
The defendant company there concerned, apparently in an effort
to stimulate lagging sales, had advertised a prize contest. Various
rewards were offered for lists of words constructed from the letters
contained in the phrase "Milnot Whips." The rules of the contest
provided that, without questioning the veracity of the phrase, contestants were to create words anagrammatically therefrom. Such
rules further declared that "Whoever builds the most words wins a
U. S. Defense Bond worth $1,000 at maturity. Prizes will be awarded
for the most complete list of words . . . But, remember, if one con-

testant has the longest list of correct words, she will be declared the
winner ... Decision of the judges to be final."12

It is from that fateful

last sentence that the tempest arose.
The plaintiff in that action, like Milnot, whipped into activity
and promptly produced and dispatched a truly formidable list of
words. It appeared from the pleadings that this list did, in fact,
dwarf all others submitted. The contest judges, despite such magnificent effort, awarded the first prize to another contestant though they
did graciously scrape a $2.00 crumb into the plaintiff's lap. His wrath
aroused, plaintiff promptly brushed that crumb aside and, with the
fury of the just, he riposted immediately by filing the instant suit.
The defendant company recovered quickly from this attack, and
lunged forward with a motion to strike the complaint. Six times did
plaintiff file new complaints. Six times, defendant moved to strike,
each time on the ground that plaintiff had agreed that the "decision
of the judges" was to be final. As regularly as clockwork, the lower
court six times agreed with the defendant and swept away the several
complaints. Ultimately, as it must come to all men, weariness descended on plaintiff and he appealed from the last strike. The Appellate Court, implying that the decision of the contest judges was but
dross at the feet of Justice, reversed and remanded with directions to
deny the motion to strike.
It is a remarkable fact that assiduous investigation reveals no
case directly in point, and there are but few cases which bear at all
1324 11.

App. 102, 57 N. E. (2d)

507 (1944).

2 324 I1. App. 102 at 103, 57 N. E. (2d) 507 at 508.
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on the question. 3 Yet the irresistible force of logic compels agreement
with the holding of the Appellate Court. Certain conclusions are so
basic in the law of contracts that to give citation thereto would
merely insult the reader. The advertisement announcing this contest
was an offer to enter into a unilateral contract, which offer was accepted by submitting a list of words. Any ambiguity in that offer
must be construed against him who had prepared the same, for the'
court must construe the meaning of the contract from the whole document. Now, was the offer equivocal?
There could be no answer to this question but, "Yes, indeed!"
Look at the rules of this contest so carefully expounded by the de-"
fendant company! Observe how insistently they declared that the
submitter of the longest list was to be entitled to the first prize! Not
once was this stated, not twice, but again and again and again! Very
well, one is overwhelmed; the longest list must be awarded the first
prize. Now to whom do these rules apply? To the common man of
course; to the postprandial peruser of the periodicals. But do they
also apply to the honorable judges of the contest? Could it be that
defendant intended that these judges were to extemporize, to invent
their own rules, as they proceeded? None could countenance such a
contention; no man of reason would so intend. It was the poet who
declared:
"Who to himself is law, no law doth need,
Offends no law and is a king indeed."
But in the history of this nation, one doctrine has stood triumphantthis is a government of laws, not one of men! All must obey the laws,
even that esoteric class of persons called contest judges.. Observe,
in that regard, what the judiciary, that noble body of men who interpret the laws, have said: "The duty of the [contest] board was purely
ministerial, and it could no more permit the terms of the contest to
be ignored than could the defendant himself. '' 4 With this, all must
agree. Contest judges, like more ordinary mortals, must be bound by
the rules.
Well, then, under these rules, what were these lofty citizens to
do? They were to decide; a most elementary thing! Yet, again, what
is meant by that apparently innocuous word "decide"? Enlightenment may be found in defendant's own authority which states that a
"decision" is a "determination or result arrived at after consideration,
as of a question." 5 Then it must follow, as the night the day, that
these judges did not "decide," for they had nothing to decide. One
could not dignify a result by the term "decision" unless there is first,
3 See annotations in 67 A. L. R. 413 and 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 305.
4 Smead v. Stearns, 173 Iowa 174 at 186, 155 N. W. 307 at 311, Ann. Cas. 1918C
745 at 750 (1915).
5 Webster's New International Dictionary.
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in fact, a question or something that requires consideration and discretion to determine. But here that was not so; the judges were
simply to count the words and verify them against the dictionary.
Their duty was purely "ministerial," they must obey the rule that
".. . the candidate who . . . is shown to have earned the largest vote'
[in the instant case, to have submitted the longest list] in accordance
with the rules, is entitled to ... receive the promised award." 6
Was this done? No, it was not! The infamy of the act of the
contest judges called out for vengeance! They did not heed the
biblical injunction to "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which
'are Caesar's."'7 They ignored the words of the eminent justice who
had so gallantly insisted that they could not "rightfully take away
from her [plaintiff] that which she had earned under the terms of the
contract, even though the defendant had contemplated by another
provision of the colntract to make the decision of the [judges] absolute and final." 8 Flaunting all such guidance and with reprehensible
temerity, they awarded the first prize to a lesser entry!
In law and in justice such thing could not be countenanced. Be
proud that a reviewing court could rise up in righteous wrath and
strike down so miserable a wrong. Well did that august body know,
that ".... the actual finding that plaintiff had given the correct number
in his answer," 9 or, as in this case, had submitted the longest list of
words, entitled him to the special first prize. And so it spoke in
gravest tones and said, "Reversed and, remanded with directions."
Thus nobly did it charge that the reward must go to plaintiff, for
"'Twas he that ranged the words at random flung,
Pierced the fair pearls and together them strung."'10
Not even a contest judge may dam the tide of logic and arithmetic.
Justice has again prevailed!
A. BAUM

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
JUDGMENT-MERGER AND BAR OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND DEFENSESWHETHER OR NOT MORE THAN ONE JUDGMENT MAY BE GRANTED IN
FAVOR OF

PLAINTIFF IN

THE SAME ACTION

AGAINST

THE SAME

PARTY

DEFENDANT-Section 50(1) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act1 has
6 See note 4, ante.
7 Matt. 22, v. 21.
8 Long v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 68 Cal. App. 171 at 180, 228 P. 873 at 876 (1924).
9 Minton v. F. G. Smith Piano Co., 36 App. D. C. 137 at 148, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.)

305 at 310 (1911).

loBidpai (PilpaV), Anvar-i Suhaili, trans. by author.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174. That statute provides, in part, that:
... Judgment may be rendered in favor of or against such parties respectively
at any stage of the proceedings . .. Judgment may be entered in such form as
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received additional interpretation through the recent case of
Zimmerman v. Bankers Life & Casualty Company.2 The facts therein
show that plaintiff based his claim upon a contract under which he
was to receive certain commissions. Defendant filed an answer
thereto purporting to state a defense to the entire claim. Later,
plaintiff moved for a judgment for part of the sum claimed as having
been "admitted in the defendant's affidavit of merits." That motion
was sustained and a final judgment for such part was entered against
the defendant. Satisfaction of that judgment was acknowledged.
Still later, the case came on for trial as to the balance of the claim
and plaintiff was awarded another judgment for the amount thereof
over defendant's objection that the matter had already been fully
adjudicated. Defendant's appeal, based on the ground that there can
be only one judgment and one satisfaction in the same cause of
action, proved unsuccessful when the Appellate Court for the First
District, affirming judgment for the plaintiff, held that Rule 75 of the
Municipal Court of Chicago 3 and Section 50(1) of the Illinois Civil
PI.actice Act permit more than one judgment in the same cause. It
said, in passing, that the court "may dispose of a segment of the litigation and render judgment thereon, reserving the remaining issues
for trial at a later time. At the later trial a distinct judgment may
be rendered." 4
The common law rule, still followed except where modified by
statute, was that but one final judgment could be entered in any action
for the reason that, upon rendition thereof, the court's jurisdiction
over the cause ceased except for the purpose of assisting in the collection of that judgment. 5 Such judgment was also held to be a bar
may be required by the nature of the case and by the recovery or relief awarded,
and more than one judgment may be rendered in the same cause." The section'
was adopted from New Jersey, Pub. Laws 1912, Ch. 231, §§ 20-1, with the addition
of the clause that "more than one judgment may be rendered in the same cause."
It applies in all civil actions, carries over the practice previously existing in
chancery cases, and is an incident to the broad provisions as to joinder.
2324 Ill. App. 370, 58 N. E. (2d) 267 (1944).
3 Manual of the Municipal Court of Chicago, 1940, p. 50. The provisions of that
rule, at least in this regard, are identical with those of Section 50 of the Civil
Practice Act.
4324 Ill. App. 370 at 374, 58 N. E. (2d) 267 at 269.
5 See Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. I, § 101, and cases 'there cited.
In
Brewer v. Christian, 9 Ill. App. 57 at 59 (1881), the court said: ". . . the plaintiff
having already taken a final judgment against defendants for that part of the
amount claimed by him, not answered by the declaration, with an award of execution therefor, he is not now entitled to a second judgment for the same sum. The
practice in such cases, as we understand it, is for the plaintiff to have an interlocutory judgment entered for the part of the declaration unanswered, but no final
judgment should be entered until the trial of the issues, when the whole amount
of the recovery can be included in one verdict and one judgment be rendered for
the whole. But we are unable to perceive how the plaintiff can be allowed to sever
his -action either as to person or amount and have several judgments rendered
against several persons, or against the same persons for several sums at different
stages of the proceeding." Accord: Vanduzen v. Pomeroy, 24 Ill. 289 (1860) ; Freeland v. Board of Supervisors, 24 Ill. 303 (1862) ; Wight v. Meredith, 5 Ill. (4
Scam.) 360 (1843).
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to further proceedings on that claim on principles of public policy.
As one writer states, "the peace and order of society, the structure
of our judicial system, and the principles of government require that
a matter once litigated should not again be drawn in question between
the same parties or their privies." 6 A final judgment pronounced by
a court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits, in the absence of
fraud or collusion is, therefore, conclusive of rights, questions,, and
facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions7
in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
This doctrine, which has formed a part of the legal systems of all
civilized nations, contemplates that no question shall become res
adjudicata until it is settled by a final judgment,8 hence interlocutory
judgments or decrees may at any time be modified or vacated by the
court which rendered them for they are not conclusive adjudications.9
But once a final judgment is rendered, it is said to be conclusive as
to all matters urged or which might have been urged at the hearing.
A judgment which has been entered as the result of a compromise
between the parties may likewise possess the force of res adjudicata. 10
In the absence of statute, therefore, the defendant's contention in the
instant case would not have been absurd.
Section 50(1) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act was obviously
designed to relax the common law rule which allowed but one final
judgment in an action, for it permits plural judgments although it
specifically directs that there shall be but one satisfaction. Several
illustrations of the change thus accomplished have already been provided although none of them reach specifically the point in the instant
case. In National Builders Bank of Chicago v. Simons," for example,
the trial court had vacated a judgment by confession instead of ordering the same to be opened up and to stand as security for.the indebtedness pending further hearing. Thereafter, the trial court entered
a summary judgment and, upon realizing within thirty days that it
had been a mistake to vacate the original judgment, it attempted to
rectify the error by setting aside the vacation order and reinstating
the judgment by confession. Such action was held proper, under the
present practice, even though it meant that the record showed there
were two judgments on the same claim. In another case, that of Shaw
Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. II, § 626, p. 1318.
299, 92 N. E. 857, 138 Am.
Ibid., Vol. II, § 624. See also People v. Amos, 246 Ill.
St. Rep. 239 (1910).
485, 18 N. E. 762 (1888).
8 Schmidt v. Glade, 126 Ill.
Quinn v.
9 People ex rel. O'Connell v. Noonan, 276 Ill. 430, 114 N. E. 928 (1916)
McMahan, 40 Ill. App. 593 (1891). See also Knox & Lewis-v. Alwood, 228 F. 753
(1915).
10 Freasman v. Smith, 379 Ill. 79, 39 N. 'E. (2d) 367 (1942) ; Wadhams v. Gay, 73
Ill. 415 (1874). In Riggs v. Barrett, 308 Ill. App. 549, 32 N. E. (2d) 382 (1941),
6

7

the court held that a decree entered by consent of the parties was binding upon
them and could not be reversed.
11 307 Ill. App. 552, 31 N. D. (2d) 269 (1940).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

v. Courtney,12 an action against several defendants for an assault, the
jury apportioned the damages among the joint tort feasors and it was
held that the court did not abuse its discretion in entering several
judgments on the several verdicts. The case of Kulesza v. Alliance
Printers & Publishers, Inc.,13 also upheld several judgments in the
same case based on separate findings against the several defendants.
The instant case, however, is the first one, since the adoption of the
Civil Practice Act, which sanctions several judgments in the same
case against the same person.
The result in the instant case not only seems proper but is comparable to that obtained in the earlier case of Mester Coal Company v. Pope,14 which arose under Section 55 of the Practice Act of
1907, as amended. 15 Plaintiff there filed an affidavit of its claim to
which defendant, pursuant to the then existing statute, filed an affidavit of merits stating that the defendant had a good defense to the
suit, upon the merits, to the whole of plaintiff's demand, "except as
to the sum of $106.06, which is admitted by the defendant to be due
to the plaintiff." Judgment for the plaintiff for the sum admittedly
due was held proper even though the jury allowed nothing on the
disputed balance. That result was said to be justified under the
statute as it then existed, the court saying: "That amendment authorizes . . .the rendition of a judgment for the part admitted to be due

and owing. That is the amendment authorizes two judgments in one
action where but one was before permissible."' 6
Such result would seem to be the only sensible solution, for there
does not appear to be any valid reason, in this state, why a person
who has a sum of money admittedly due him should not be able to
secure prompt enforcement of that claim, even though other parts of
the same claim may be in dispute and may need determination at a
subsequent time. Granted that two suits would be improper, 17 still
two judgments in the same suit should accomplish the desired result.
The practitioner who contemplates taking a judgment for the admitted portion of a claim would do well, however, to observe the
cautionary admonition of the court in the instant case. To avoid any
implication that such judgment is final as to all issues involved, the
judgment order should continue the cause for trial as to any balance
in dispute, thereby clearly indicating an intention to reserve jurisdictibn over all unsettled matters.
H. H. FLENTYE
12317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N. E. '(2d) 170 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 249, affirmed in 385 Ill. 559, 53 N. E. (2d) 432 (1944).

13 318 11. App. 231, 47 N. E. (2d) 547 (1943).
14 155 Ill. App. 667 (1910).
15 Cahill Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 110, § 55. The present provision in Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 181, is similar in purpose and stems from the earlier statute.
16 155 Ill. App. 667 at 671.
17 City of Bloomington v. Burke, 12 Ill. App. 314 (1883).
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS.
BANKS

AND

BANKING-LIABILITY

OF SHAREHOLDERS-WHETHER

OR

NOT HOLDERS OF BENEFICIAL INTERESTS IN A BUSINESS TRUST WHICH
OWNS STOCK OF BANK ARE SUBJECT TO SUPERADDED LIABILITY IMPOSED
STOCKHOLDERS OF INSOLVENT BANK-In Reconstruction Finance
Corporationv. Goldberg,' the facts disclosed that judgment had been
taken against the holder of record of certain shares in a closed bank
but that, pursuant to reservation of jurisdiction, certain members of
a syndicate organized as a business or so-called Massachusetts trust
were made additional parties defendant in order to impose liability
on them for the same shares. It appeared that the active control of the
trust business was in the hands of a managing committee of three
members, of whom appellant was one, which committee, on behalf of
the beneficiaries of the trust and in the course of authorized trust
business, had purchased shares of bank stock and caused the same to
be registered in the name of a nominee. The trust agreement contained a standard exculpatory clause which recited that neither the
managing committee, which was authorized to hold legal title to all
securities purchased, nor the members of the syndicate, should be perON

1143 F. (2d) 752 (1944).
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sonally liable for any debt or contract and that any one contracting
with the committee should look only to the trust property for satisfaction. It was urged, By way of defense, that plaintiff's election to
sue the holder of record had operated to release defendant, 2 and that,
as the bank stock was owned by the syndicate as an entity under a
valid trust, only syndicate funds could be subjected to obligations
arising out of ownership of the stock in view of the exculpatory
clause. Judgment for plaintiff on summary proceedings was affirmed
in the*Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit when that
court held that the double liability imposed by the Illinois constitution on stockholders of insolvent banking corporations 3 attached to
shareholders in a business trust, at least to the extent of their proportionate interests therein, and that the prior judgment against the
4
holder of record was not res adjudicata on the question.
In order to arrive at such decision, the court lacked substantial
precedent insofar as the shareholdings of a business trust might be
concerned although a line of cases 5 culminating in Anderson v.
Abbott6 have held stockholders in holding companies owning bank
stock liable as the beneficial owners thereof. In such cases, the courts
have had no hesitancy in "piercing the corporate veil" and finding
the shareholders in the several holding companies to be the beneficial
or real owners of the bank stock and liable thereon though it is true
that, in the majority thereof, the bank stock was the chief, if not the
only, asset of the particular holding company concerned and control
7
of the bank in question was the main purpose for its organization.
2 That issue had been determined, adversely to defendant's contention, in Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349 at 354, 64 S. Ct. 531 at 534, 88 L. Ed. 535 at 538 (1944),
noted in 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 284, particularly p. 287, note 18.
3 111. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 6.
4The argument that Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Pelts, 123 F. (2d)
503 (1941), and Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Barrett, 131 F. (2d) 745
(1942), had been nullified by Trupp v. First Englewood State Bank, 307 Ill. App.
258, 30 N. El. (2d) 198 (1940), and Capetti v. Allborg, 319 Ill. App. 643, 49 N. E.
(2d) 795 (1943), was rejected on the ground that in the last mentioned cases no
attempt had been made to reserve jurisdiction over the cause. Anderson v.
Abbott, 321 U. S. 349, 64 S. Ct. 531, 88 L. Ed. 535 (1944), speaks more clearly on
the point.
5 Barbour v. Thomas, 300 U. S. 670, 57 S. Ct. 513, 81 L. Ed. 877 (1937) ; Nettles
v. Rhett, 94 F. (2d) 42 (1938); Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, 79 F (2d)
263, 103 A. L. R. 912 (1935) ; Corker v. Soper, 53 F. (2d) 190 (1931); Fors v.
Farrell, 271 Mich. 358, 260 N. W. 886 (1935) ; Simons v. Grosbeck, 268 Mich. 495,
256 N. W. 496 (1934) ; Nettles v. Sottile, 184 S. C. 1, 191 S. E. 796 (1937).
See
also McClanahan, Bank Stock Liability and the Holding Company Device, 19
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvrEw 160 (1941).
Illinois cases having bearing on the point
are Gahagan v. Whitney. 359 Ill. 419,_194 N. E. 581 (1935) ; Flanagan v. Madison
Square State Bank, 302 Ill. App. 468, 24 N. E. (2d) 202 (1939).
Of further interest is United States v. Gridley, 52 F. Supp. 398 (1943).
6321 U. S. 349, 64 S. Ct. 531, 88 L. Ed. 535 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAw RTViEW 284.
7 Burrows v. Emery, 285 Mich. 86, 280 N. W. 120 (1938), however, indicates that
a different result might be achieved if the holding company is a bona fide organization possessing other assets beside the bank stock on which liability is sought
to be imposed.
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In view of the more or less settled law as to holding companies as
indicated by such cases, it is only to be expected and seemingly proper
for the court in the instant case to hold the shareholders of a business
trust liable upon its bank stock holdings on much the same theory.
If corporate structure does not serve to insulate from liability, certainly a mere trust agreement, no matter how valid the same might
otherwise be, should not.
Reliance was placed by defendant in the instant case on an exculpatory clause such as is usually found in trust agreements of the type
involved. The court indicated that as it was not shown that the
creditor of the insolvent bank had knowledge of the existence of such
clause, the same could not operate as a defense.8 Had the creditor
possesed knowledge and dealt with the bank in the face thereof, it
was said that the defendant still could not escape liability of the kind
in question for, just as legislation will not be permitted to defeat the
purpose of a constitutional provision imposing such liability,9 the
parties to the trust agreement could not extinguish or narrow the
same by the terms of their contract. While the latter statement was
pure dictum, it would seem sound for any contract violating a constitutional provision would be regarded as opposed to public policy.
It should be noticed, however, that such dictum could not apply as
to the ordinary creditors of a business trust for it has been held that
they may enforce their rights only pursuant to the terms of the trust
agreement. 10 In dealing with such an organization, they should be
held chargeable with knowledge of the terms of the agreement or else
be held bound to inquire into the same."

J.
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NOT UNCOLLECTED JUDGMENTS AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS
BASED ON THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
BY RECEIVER APPOINTED IN

HONOROFF

OR

OF CLOSED BANK

LIABILITY MAY BE SOLD AND ASSIGNED

STOCKHOLDERS'

LIABILITY SUIT-In

Decker

8 143 F. (2d) 752 at 757.

9In Sanders v. Merchants' State Bank, 349 Ill. 547 at 557, 182 N. E. 897 at 900
(1932), the court said: "No banking act can go into operation in this state of
which the constitutional provision in question shall not be a part. By virtue of
the inherent power of the Constitution itself, such provision is grafted into every
banking law which is passed by the Legislature or submitted to the votes of the
people."
10 Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N. E. 250, 58 A. L. R. 485 (1927);
Levy v. Nellis, 284 Ill. App. 228, 1 N. E. (2d) 251 (1936) ; Hunter v. Winter, 268
Ill. App. 487 (1932). But see Review Printing & Stationery Co. v. McCoy, 291 Ill.
App. 524, 10 N. U. (2d) 506 (1937).
:- In general, see Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. II, §§ 294-300.
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v. Domoney,' certain creditors of an Illinois state bank brought a
representative suit some time after the bank had been closed to enforce the stockholders' constitutional liability. 2 That liability was,
in due course, reduced to judgment against all shareholders within
the jurisdiction of the court and a receiver was appointed, who proceeded to collect a substantial amount of account thereof and made
distribution through the liquidating receiver of the closed bank.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a petition with the court requesting an
order directing the receiver in the shareholders' liability suit to sell
the uncollected portion of such judgment at public sale and to execute
proper assignment to the purchaser. An order for sale was entered.
More than thirty days thereafter,3 other creditors of the bank obtained
leave of court to move to vacate the order of sale on the ground that
the judgment involved belonged exclusively to the creditors of the
bank and was not assignable particularly in the absence of constitutional or statutory provision on the point.4 The trial court.agreed
that it lacked jurisdiction and vacated the order of sale. On direct
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court because a construction of constitutional provisions was involved, that court reversed on the ground
that, as the liability of stockholders in a defunct bank was enforcible
in equity in a representative action, the absence of statutory authority
did not limit the general equity powers of the trial court which might,
for the purpose of making distribution of the assets, order its receiver
to compromise or sell the uncollected claims.
The decision-is one of significance as well as of first impression
in this state for it settles a point over which there has been some doubt.
It goes far toward facilitating the settlement and termination of representative suits which have dragged along to the point where the rule
of diminishing returns has now set in. 5 It suggests a practical pro1 387 Ill. 524, 56 N. E. (2d) 750 (1944). A comparable problem involving assignment of claim for stockholder's liability in a national bank was subsequently
presented in Wagner v. South Chicago Say. Bank, 146 F. (2d) 686 (1945), where
the majority of the court arrived at substantially the same conclusion. Major,
C. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
2Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 6. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16 , § 6.
3 Such order would ordinarily be final after the expiration of thirty days from
the date of its rendition: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174(1). The right to
move to vacate after the lapse of thirty days was said to rest on the fact that the
order was void for lack of jurisdiction: 387 Ill. 524 at 527, 56 N. E. (2d) 750 at
752.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16/2, § 11, was enacted to provide machinery for the
enforcement of the constitutional provision. That statute is silent as to the right
of the receiver in the liability suit to sell uncollected judgments although It does
authorize the liquidating receiver of the closed bank to take such action.
5 As the suit continues, it becomes increasingly difficult to collect any money at
all. It is scarcely worth the time and effort of the receiver, while the expenses of
the suit, receiver's fees, attorney's fees, etc., tend to exceed the amount collected. As
a consequence, the creditors cannot expect any appreciable benefit from a continuation of the suit and would, in the main, be better off by sale and distribution of the
sale proceeds.
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cedure to be followed for the closing of such cases, but whether it is
logically sound or not is another problem. 6
There are two lines of authority throughout the country on this
subject which present conflicting views. Under one of them, the
stockholders' liability evidenced by judgment is regarded in the
nature of a trust fund for the sole and exclusive benefit of the credi-.
tors and, although collectible by a receiver appointed in a representative suit, the latter may not assign or transfer either the claim or the
judgment arising therefrom. According to that view, the creditors
have exclusive title to the judgment while the receiver is merely an
officer of the court to accept satisfaction thereof. Lacking any title,
the receiver, cannot give any valid assignment. 7 Practical considerations are rejected under that view as not being in conformity with the
purpose of the statute imposing liability.8 In contrast, the rule pre.vails elsewhere that judgments rendered in stockholders liability suits
are assignable in the same fashion as other judgments, 9 although that
view is sometimes founded upon statutory authority. 10
While the Illinois court has seen fit to adopt the latter view in
the absence of statutory authority, the premises underlying its de6 Argument was advanced in the instant case that to permit the sale of such
judgments would be opening the door to potential fraud upon creditors by permitting sale at less than what might be collected thereon. The court herein disposed of that argument by saying that since the sale was to be conducted under
the direction and subject to the approval of the court and must be found to be
for the best interests of the creditors, such creditors were sufficiently protected:
387 Il. 524 at 530, 56 N. E. (2d) 750 at 753.
7 In Andrew v. State Bank of Swea City, 214 Iowa 1339, 242 N. W. 62 (1932),
an* order was obtained by a receiver to sell uncollected stock assessments which
lhad not been reduced to judgment. Such assessments were held unassignable on
the theory that they represented the sole and exclusive property of the creditors.
Subsequently, in Roe v. King, 217 Iowa 213, 251 N. W. 81 (1933), an attempt wasmade to distinguish that case from the holding in the, Andrew case on the ground
that the assessments had been reduced to judgment. Despite this, the court held
that the receiver could assign nothing. See also Hood v. Richardson Realty, Inc.,
211. N. C. 582, 191 S. E. 410 (1937) ; Griffin v. Brewer, 167 Oki. 654, 31 P. (2d) 619
(1934)'; American Exchange Bank v. Rowsey, 144 Okl. 172. 289 P. 726 (1930);
State v. Kelley, 141 OkI. 36, 284 P. 65 (1930). Textual treatment of the subject
may be found in Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (Perm. Ed.), Vol. 13, § 6499.
8 See, for example, Andrew v. State Bank of Swea City, 214 Iowa 1339 at 1346,
242 N. W. 62 at 65, where the court said: "Moreover, the enforcement of this
claim . . . cannot be justified upon any ground such as that it is economical to
gather up the tag ends of a receivership and dispose of them for whatever they will
bring at auction in order that the receivership may be closed. That reasoning
may be perfectly good as to property other than this special limited liability involved in this case. Such liability cannot be hawked at auction and sold to speculators for their individual aggrandizement, with little or no benefits flowing to the
stockholders. To do so would be to plainly circumvent .the manifest purpose of the
statute."
9.Waldron v. Alling, 76 N. Y. S. 250 (1902) ; Schaberg's Estate v. McDonald, 60
Neb. 493, 83 N. W. 737 (1900).
10 White v. Taylor, 187 Ark. 1, 58 S. W. (2d) 210 (1933).
The holding in Shaw
v. Strong (Tex. Civ. App.), ,35 S. W. (2d) 769 (1931), which denied a right to assign, was subsequently changed by statute permitting such- action: Hill v. South
Texas Bank & Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 73 S. W. (2d) 1043 (1934).
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cision are vaguely indicated by the statement that such authority is
said to rest on the general equitable powers of the court. The principle was laid down quite early in Golden v. Cervenka" that the liability of the shareholders imposed by the state constitution was designed for the sole and exclusive benefit of the creditors of the bank
to be enforced individually in an action at law 1 2 or collectively in a
representative suit in equity.' 8 For that reason, it was declared in
Burket v. Reliance Bank & Trust Company 14 that a receiver appointed
by the court in such a proceeding was merely the court's officer for
the purpose of collecting, receiving and disbursing the proceedsof
that liability and was not a party to and had no control over the
creditor's suit to determine the extent of that liability. That decision
would seem to indicate that the receiver, ,being only a representative
of the court and not of the creditors, would have no title to the cause
of action or to the judgment flowing therefrom. It should be noted,
however, that the court said he was not a party to the determination
of the stockholders' liability. After that determination, the creditorplaintiff conducting the suit could no longer settle his claim or agree
to a dismissal of the suit for by then the right of all the creditors had
become vested in the judgment which inured to their collective benefit. 15 By reason of the statute, collection or composition of the judgment so rendered can be made only by the receiver appointed in such
proceeding,' 6 but that fact does not vest title to the judgment in such
receiver. While the stockholders who have paid would seem to have
no interest in the distribution of the fund which they were compelled
to create for the satisfaction of their liabilities,' 7 it does not follow
that the receiver is entitled to that fund or to more than the right to
collect the judgment as the arm of the court which pronounced the
same. Distribution of funds collected by that receiver may best be
accomplished by delivering the same to the liquidating receiver of
the closed bank for ultimate payment to those entitled thereto, 8 but
iz

278 Ill. 409, 116 N. E. 273 (1917).

That case emphatioally denies that the

liquidating receiver has any authority or right to enforce the constitutional liability.
12 Schalucky v. Field, 124 Ill. 617, 16 N. E. 904 (1888) ; Wincock v. Turpin, 96
Ill. 135 (1880) ; Culver v. Third Nat. Bank of Chicago, 64 Ill. 528 (1871).
13 Leonard v. Bye, 361 Ill. 185, 197 N. E. 546, 101 A. L. R. 569 (1935).. But see
Zimmerman v. Zeimer, 363 Ill.
220, 1 N. E. (2d) 854 (1936).
14367 Ill. 196, 11 N. E. (2d) 6 (1937).
15 Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 173.
16 Ill.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16'', § 11.
17 Comstock v. Morgan Park Trust & Savings Bank, 363 Ill. 341, 2 N. E. (2d) 311
(1936). But see Holderman v. Moore State Bank, 383 Ill. 534, 50 N. E. (2d) 741
(1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIa W 216, which indicates that the receiver can be directed to pay back funds remaining in his hands in excess of the
debts accrued.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 161/2, § 11, does direct that: "The funds so collected
... shall be distributed according to law among the creditors of said bank in such
manner as the court shall direct." See also Heine v. Degen, 362 Ill. 357, 199 N. E.
832 (1936).
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authority to collect and distribute falls short of the power to assign
and pass title. 19
The court in the instant case said, in effect, that the judgments,
to the extent which they remained uncollected, were choses in action
and constituted a res under the jurisdiction of the court which, pursuant to its equity powers, could be sold just as it had power to
collect and distribute the funds arising therefrom. That authority,
if it exists, could not be drawn from the language of the statute for
the situation is not comparable to that in which a liquidating receiver
of the closed bank seeks to sell and dispose of its assets 20 nor is it
like that found in the case of the dissolution of an ordinary private
corporation. 21 It must, then, rest on certain alleged "general equity
powers."

The fundamental power of a court of equity to assert control
over property through a receiver is usually confined to taking possession thereof rather than title thereto.22 If any sale of such property
is made, it can be done only because the court has acquired jurisdiction over the res. 23 When that res takes the form of a judgment
which the court itself has pronounced, it is fundamental law that
jurisdiction over that judgment, as a species of property, can be exercised only for certain limited purposes such as acting to vacate or
review the same, to enforce the collection thereof, or entering satisfaction when satisfaction has been made. In all other respects, the
judgment is the property of the judgment creditor and may not be
taken from him except by due process of law.2 4 If the judgment runs
in favor of several persons, it may not be split between them so as to
permit one of them to exercise a right to redeem from an execution
sale or to permit him to make a fractional assignment thereof.2 5 Being joint property,2 6 it can only be dealt with by all of them acting
lO An attorney at law, for example, has no right to assign a judgment in favor
of his client in the absence of express authority: Schroeder v. Wolf, 227 Ill. 133,
81 N. E. 13 (1907).
See also Peacock v. Pembroke, 8 Md. 348 (1855).
No one
could validly claim that a sheriff, although he may collect and satisfy a judgment
pursuant to a. writ of execution, would be in a position to give an assignment of
such judgment without express authority from the judgment creditor. Both of
these officers are as much officers of the court as the receiver.
20 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 161/2, § 11, specifically gives such receiver the "title
to the books, records and assets of every description of such banks." See also
McIlvalne v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 314 Ill. App. 496, 42 N. E.
(2d)

93 (1942),

noted in 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 3, cause transferred 371

Ill. 565, 21 N. E. (2d) 737 (1939).
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, § 157.87.
22 Hooper v. Winston, Trustee. 24 Ill. 353 (1860).
See also Tardy's Smith on
Receivers, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, §§ 41-2.
23 Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 11. 150, 25 N. E. 680 (1890).
24 Burket v. Reliance Bank & Trust Co., 367 Ill. 196, 11 N. E. (2d) 6 (1937). 25 Chicago Trust Co. v. Dorchester Terrace Bldg. Corp., 317 Ill. App. 293, 45
N. E. (2d) 1001 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Rsvmw 50.
26 Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 173.
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jointly unless it might be said that, on proper application, 27partition
could be made or sale had because partition was impossible.

-

It is only on this latter theory that there might be any legal
justification for the conclusion reached in the instant case, but it does
not appear that any such application was made therein. Although
the decision is of doubtful validity, it must be acknowledged that the
outcome of the case furnishes a practical and expedient solution for
what might otherwise become an intolerable situation. If title to the
judgment could be transmitted only by assignment executed by all of
the judgment creditors, practical obstacles would be apt to defeat the
giving of such an assignment. Assuming such action was impossible,
the only alternatives would be to discharge the receiver when it reasonably appeared that further collection was unlikely, leaving no one
actively interested in the enforcement of the unpaid judgment, or else
retain the receiver in office until the judgment was ultimately extinguished by passage of time. Perhaps an exercise of vague "general
equitable powers" could, therefore, be said to be warranted.
R. BURDETT
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DEED

DELIVERED AFTER DEATH OF ONE OF CO-GRANTORS Is EFFECTIVE TO TRANSFER THE INTEREST OF THE SURVIVING GRANTOR-A

rather novel factual

situation was presented in the case of Creighton v. Elgin' recently
decided by the Illinois Supreme Court. It appeared that, in 1918,
one Creighton executed a deed to certain real property to his two
sons as tenants in common. The deed was also signed and acknowledged by the grantor's wife, although she owned no interest in the
property at that time other than an inchoate right of dower. That
deed was never effectively delivered during Creighton's lifetime but
remained in his wife's custody. Upon his death, his wife became
owner in fee of the property covered by the deed as sole devisee under
her husband's will. In 1936, she apparently delivered the deed to one
of the grantees and it was then recorded. After the death of one of
the grantees, Mrs. Creighton having died in the meantime, a suit for
partition was brought by such grantee's widow on the theory that the
subsequint delivery of the deed by Mrs. Creighton was competent to
convey her entire fee ,simple interest to the grantees, thereby giving
the plaintiff certain rights as sole devisee of such deceased grantee.
The trial court held the deed void for want of delivery during Mr.
Creighton's lifetime. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, being of the opinion that the deed was in form
27 Although statutory partition is confined to interests in land, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1943, Ch. 106, § 1, equitable right to compel partition of personal property has been
recognized: Robinson v. Dickey, 143 Ind. 205, 42 N. E. 679, 52 Am. St. Rep. 417
(1896). See also 47 C. J., Partition, § 66; 40 Am. Jur., Partition, § 104.
1387111. 592, 56 N. E. (2d) 825 (1944).
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legally sufficient to convey the fee simple title to the property despite
the death of one of the grantors prior to delivery, although there was
some question as to the effectiveness of the purported delivery in
1936 which required a new trial.
. The question here presented can be simply stated as follows:
-IfA and B, as co-grantees, execute a deed to C and D as tenants in
common, but the deed is not delivered until after A's death, is such
deed competent to convey B's interest in the property although void
as to A's interest for want of delivery? If so, should the holding be
any different if B's rights or estate have been increased or enlarged
between execution and delivery?
There can be no argument as to the insufficiency of the deed
here involved to pass the interest of Mr. Creighton, for it is well
established that a deed which is not effectively delivered during the
grantor's lifetime is incapable of transferring the property after the
grantor's death. 2 No act of the grantee can complete the delivery
after that time.3 The logic for such rule lies in the fact that if a'
grantor wishes to convey real property by deed, he must effectively
deliver it while he lives; for if he intends the deed to become operative only in the event of his death, the instrument would amount to
an attempt to make a testamentary disposition and would be valid
only if statutory requirements as to execution and attestation were
4
*satisfied.
Just why a joint deed, on the other hand, should be rendered void
in its. entirety if not effectively delivered prior to the death of either
grantor is not too clear. Had the co-grantors, instead of joining in
the same deed, sought to accomplish their purpose by conveying
their respective interests through separate deeds, the death of one
grantor before delivery of his deed could not possibly affect the
validity of the deed of the other if it was properly delivered. There
is no patent interrelation between the two deeds which should operate to nullify both. Where, for convenience, both parties use the
same instrument to transfer the separate rights of each, there would
seem no logical basis for achieving any different result.
-While, after death of a co-grantor, the joint deed may contain
extraneous matter, e. g. the name of the deceased grantor, his signature, the description of any property which would not pass by such
deed, and the deceased grantor's personal covenants, still that provides no plausible reason why the entire instrument should be invalidated. Applying the theory that the instrument may be severable
2 Johnson v. Fulk, 282 Il. 328, 118 N. E. 706 (1918) ; Nofftz v. Nofftz, 290 Ill.
36,
124
N. E. 838 (1919) ; Ehrlich v. Tritt, 316 Ill.
221, 147 N. E. 40 (1925).
.8 Biggins
v. Lambert, 115 Il1. App. 576 (1904), affirmed in 213 Ill. 625, 73 N. E.
871, 104 Am. St. Rep.. 238 (1905).
4Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §§ 193-4. See also, for example, Rouland v. Burton,
296 Ill. App. 138, 15 N. E. (2d) 920 (1938).
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in its nature and need not stand or fall as a unit, it may be regarded
as valid in part although inoperative in part. 5 So long as the deed
satisfies the statutory requirements, contains the names of the grantor
bound thereby as well as the grantee, uses appropriate words of grant,
has an accurate description of the real estate conveyed, and bears the
signature of the surviving grantor, it should pass that grantor's estate.6 It need not be acknowledged as the words of the statute are
not mandatory, 7 nor is any exact or prescribed form of words necessary so long as an intention to convey is expressed.8 From pure
reasoning, therefore, the instant holding would seem correct particularly when it is remembered that every deed speaks only as of thetime of its delivery regardless of its date. 9
Reported cases from other jurisdictions on the exact issue here
involved are admittedly scarce. However, Schoenberger's Executors
v. Zook' ° is such a case. There, certain property owned by a woman
was to be conveyed by deed which she had signed and in which her
husband had joined. The grantee refused to accept delivery during
the woman's lifetime, but after her death took delivery from the
surviving co-grantor. The court held such deed was competent to
pass the husband's interest as tenant by the curtesy, although it declared that the conveyance did not affect the rights of the heirs of the
deceased wife who, upon her death, had succeeded to the reversion.
Decisions on the converse to that situation, and opposite to the
problem presented by the instant case, would serve to reinforce the
correctness of that holding. In Hopkins v. Slusher," for example,
a deed was made in favor of two grantees but was not delivered until
after the death of one of them. It was held to operate as a conveyance
to the surviving grantee, but only of such interest as he would have
taken had his deceased co-grantee survived the delivery. Direct-and
indirect precedent, therefore, sustain the instant decision at least as
to the first query.
On the remaining point, i. e. whether the deed was sufficient to
transfer only the inchoate interest held by the surviving grantor on
the date of the deed or would serve to pass the interest later acquired'
5]Payne v. The Mayor of Brecon, 3 H. & N. 572, 157 Eng. Rep. 597 (1858).
Analogous cases may be found with reference to the effect of an alteration made
by one party upon the obligations of another party contained in the same deed:
Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. VI, § 1888. As to partial enforcement of valid
portions of contracts partly tainted by illegality, see Williston, op. cit., Vol. V,
§ 1660.
6 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 30, § 8.
7 Ibid., Ch. 30, § 19.
s Cross v. Weare Commission Co., 153 Ill. 499, 38 N. E. 1038, 46 Am. St. Rep.
902 (1894).
9 Totten v. Totten, 294 Ill. 70, 128 N. E. 295 (1920) ; Bearss v. Ford, 108 Ill. 16
(1883) ; MacVeagh v. Chase & Sanborn, 67 Il1. App. 160 (1896).
1034 Pa. St. 24 (1859).
11266 Ky. 300, 98 S. W. (2d) 932, 108 A. L. R. 662 (1936).
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the law is much clearer. Although, at time of signing, it may have
been the intention of the surviving grantor to pass only an inchoate
interest, the effective date on which to measure the true intent is
that on which delivery takes place. 12 At that time the surviving
grantor in the instant case knew she held a larger interest for she
had, in the interim between signing and delivery, conveyed portions
of the described premises. Under the circumstances, therefore, the
surviving grantor's intent must have been to transfer the interest she
then possessed. That the deed then described more property than the
surviving grantor owned would not of itself render the conveyance
nugatory nor affect the title of the innocent interim purchasers. 13
If, therefore, the deed concerned in the instant case was, in fact,
eventually delivered, a holding that it was operative to convey the
interest of the surviving co-grantor was justified.
M. C. MAITLAND
EXECUTORS

AND

ADMINISTRATORS -APPOINTMENT,

AND TENURE-WHETHER

QUALIFICATION,

OR NOT HOSTILITY TOWARD DISTRIBUTEES

AF-

FECTS COMPETENCY OF PERSON OTHERWISE ENTITLED TO ACT AS ADMINISTRATOR-In

Dennis v. Dennis,' the court was asked to determine the

right of one son, named Jacob, to be appointed administrator with

the will annexed of the mother's estate as opposed to the appointment
of a nominee of another son, named Frederick, who had been named
as executor thereunder but was disqualified from acting by reason of
his confinement in the penitentiary.2 Under the father's will, his
entire estate had been given to Jacob after a life estate in favor of
the mother and Frederick had been disinherited. The mother, deeming that an injustice had been done to her wayward son, renounced
the provisions of that will and claimed her statutory share in fee.
She thereafter, by will, devised such share to Frederick. Upon her
death, rival petitions for appointment to administer her estate were
filed by the two sons. The county court, finding that a long-standing
animosity existed between the two sons and that Jacob had made no
accounting of the father's estate, appointed Frederick's nominee.
That order was reversed by the Circuit Court upon the ground that
although there was a great conflict of personal feelings there was no
such adversity of legal interest as to require the disqualification of
Jacob, as a member of a class, in favor of a mere nominee. 3 On appeal,
12

13

See cases cited in note 9, ante.
Doe ex dem. McConnel v. Reed, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 117 (1842) ; Brown v. Banner

Coal & Oil Co., 97 Ill. 214 (1881).
1 323 Ii. App. 328, 55 N. E. (2d) 527 (1944).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 229 and § 246, declares that a person convicted of
a crime rendering him infamous is not qualified to act as executor or administrator.
3 As to preference between a member and nominee of a member, see In re
Marco's Estate, 314 1ll. App. 560, 41 N. E. (2d) 783 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGOKENT LAW REVIEW 194.
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the Appellate Court for the Fourth District reversed the circuit court
and remanded with directions to appoint Frederick's nominee because
it found that the hostile feeling between the two brothers amounted
to a sufficient conflict of interest to warrant such action. 4
No clear precedent for such action exists in Illinois for it was
heretofore regarded as necessary that, in order to pass over a member
of a class in favor of a nominee, the member had to be disqualified
by reason of some actual legal adverse interest to the estate over which
he sought to administer 5 or else had demonstrated his unfitness by a
failure to observe his duties in managing the affairs of another and
related estate. 6 While it is true that Jacob had not performed his
duties as administrator of the father's estate with technical precision, 7
there was no showing that he had been guilty of mismanagement nor
did it appear that he had any claim against the mother's estate which
might render him incapable of acting in a disinterested' fashion.8
The sole conflict, therefore, had to lie in the animosity of personal
feeling which existed between the two sons.
There is no doubt that, under the law of other jurisdictions,
antagonism toward those interested in an estate may be taken into
consideration when determining the fitness of a person to act as
administrator or executor, 9 for the right of interested parties to have
an impartial and equitable distribution of the estate is the dominant
one and ascendant over the right of any particular individual to
administer.' 0 An antagonistic and hostile feeling must actually exist,
however, for mere prejudice toward the distributees will not serve
to disqualify,1 ' and that unfriendly or hostile feeling must be -of
such character as would be likely to prevent the management of the
estate in accordance with the dictates of prudence and in the interest
12
of the heirs, devisees and creditors.
Cases do exist which declare that mere personal hostility toward
a distributee will not necessarily serve to disqualify one from acting
as personal representative of an estate, but on analysis they reveal
4 Although Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 246, does not impose such test to determine qualification, that view was engrafted by Heward v. Slagle, 52 Ill. 336 (1869).
5 See, for example, Heward v. Slagle, 52 Ill. 336 (1869).6 Justice v. Wilkins, 251 Ill. 13, 95 N. E. 1025 (1911).
7 It did appear that no account had been filed therein although he had served as
administrator for som twenty-one months, and petition to compel him to report
had become necessary, but the estate appeared to be a complicated and substantial
one and the delay might have been justified: 323 Ill. App. 328 at 331 and 338, 55
N. E. (2d) 527 at 528 and 531.
S On that point, see Stines v. Brock, 185 Ill. App. 22 (1913).
9 Martin v. Otis, 233 Mass. 491, 124 N. E. 294, 6 A. L. R. 1340 (1919) ; Nickels
v. Horsley, 126 Va. 54, 100 S. E. 831 (1919).
10 Ex parte Small, 69 S. C. 43, 48 S. E. 40 (1904).
11 In re Wright, 177 Cal. 274, 170 P. 610 (1918) ; In re Bauquier's Estate, 88 Cal.
478, 26 P. 373 (1891).
12 Stevens v. Larwill, 110 Mo. App. 140, 84 S. W. 113 (1904).
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that, as in Davis' Administrator v. Davis,13 the alleged hostility lay

more nearly in the nature of a lack of interest in the heir or legatee
rather than one of hatred, 14 or else, as in Barnett's Administrator v.
Pittman,15 represented a conflict of financial interests. In only one
case, that of Dooley v. Dooley,", does it appear that a clearly contrary
holding to that in the instant case was reached. There rival petitions
for administration of an estate were presented by two brothers, each
being supported by an equal number of the other children, but the
court upheld the right of one brother to administer, despite his enmity
toward Some of the other children, on the ground that such children
were protected by the official bond required of the administrator in
case of any mismanagement of the estate. In contrast to such paucity
of authority, many decisions support the proposition that hostility
toward distributees will justify the disqualification
of a person other7
wise entitled to act as an administrator.
Practical considerations governing the appointment of an administrator would seem to support the decision in the instant case as well
as the holdings in other jurisdictions which subscribe to the principles followed therein. Certainly, when the chief beneficiary of the
estate is confined in the penitentiary, he needs the assistance of a
wholly disinterested and loyal person to watch over his interests and
should not be forced to rely solely on an official bond.
M.
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MAITLAND

EMPLOYEES-

REFUSED

CERTIFICA-

TION AND APPOINTMENT, MAY RECOVER WAGES FOR THE ELAPSED PERIOD
BETWEEN MANDAMUS ORDER AND ACTUAL APPOINTMENT-In the case of

Corbett v. City of Chicago,' plaintiffs had taken and passed civil
service examinations for positions as police clerks. Having been re-

fused certification and appointment, they instituted mandamus proceedings and were granted a peremptory writ in 1941. The defendant
city appealed from such decision, but the same was affirmed by the
162 Ky. 316; 172 S. W. 665 (1915).
14 The court noted that the allegedly disqualified person was the paternal grandfather of the child, lived just across the street, but had rarely seen the child, had
never exhibited any interest in or solicitude about its welfare, and, in fact, had
entertained some doubts as to its paternity: 162 Ky. 316 at.319, 172 S. W. 665 at
666.
15 282 Ky. 162, 137 S. V. (2d) 1098 (1940).
16 240 S. W. 1112 (Tex. Civ. App., 1922).
17 In re Tracy's Estate, 214 Iowa 881, 243 N. W. 309 (1932) ; Hunt v. Crocker,
246 Ky. 338, 55 S. W. (2d) 20 (1932) ; In re Drew's Appeal, 58 N. H. 319 (1878) ;
Ellis v. Ellis, 42 N. D. 535, 174 N. W. 76 (1919) ; In re Estate of Schmidt, 183 Pa.
St. 129, 38 A. 464 (1897) ; In re Warner's Estate, 207 Pa. 5S0, 57 A. 35, 99 Am. St.
Rep. 804 (1904) ; In re Fleming's Estate, 135 Pa: Super. 423, 5 A. (2d) 599 (1939)
In re Pike's Estate, 45'Wis. 391 (1878).
1323 Il. App. 429, 55 N. E. (2d) 717 (1944).
13
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Appellate Court and leave to appeal was denied. 2 ' Plaintiffs were
finally certified and appointed in 1942. They thereupon filed the present suit, seeking to collect wages for the period from the date of the
original peremptory writ to the actual time of appointment. Plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendant's amended answer, which relied
on the defense of payment to de facto incumbents, was allowed and
judgment for the salary accrued was awarded plaintiffs. On appeal
from that judgment, the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed on the ground that payment of the wages to de facto employees
during the contested period was not a good defense.
The precise question presented by the instant case does not appear to have been before any Illinois reviewing court, nor before the
courts of any other jurisdiction. Proper consideration of the controversy can, therefore, only be obtained from" a review of allied problems. The situation is directly analogous to cases involving the
wrongful removal of civil service employees. In cases of that type,
the decisions of the Illinois courts present a pattern which is kaleidoscopically confused. One of the early cases, that of City of Chicago
v. LuthardtA responsible for much of the subsequent confusion, dealt
with the general question of the right of a wrongfully removed employee to obtain compensation for the period of his removal. When
deciding that the employee had the right to such compensation, the
court said: "The legal right to the office carried with it the right to
the salary or emoluments of the office. The salary follows the legal
title."' 4 There was, however, clear implication in that decision that
payment to a de facto employee would have constituted a good defense. So, even at the inception of the "title theory" in this state,
qualifications were apparently recognized.
Some time afterward, the Supreme Court again had occasion to
speak on this problem. In Bullis v. City of Chicago,5 it reiterated
the doctrine of the Luthardt case and even strengthened it by a
further statement to the effect that the salary follows the legal title
and not the occupation and exercise of the duties of the office. Yet
it again gave tacit recognition to the exception that actual payment
to a de facto employee should be regarded as a good defense. That
fundamental doctrine appeared to be so settled that, in a subsequent
case, 6 the question of the right to compensation was decided without
further discussion.
Ultimately, 'however, the Supreme Court was brought face to face
2 See People ex rel. Corbett v. Allman, 312 Ill.App. 484, 38 N. E. (2d) 810
(1942). Leave to appeal denied: 316 Ill. App. xiv.
-3191 Ill. 516, 61 N. E. 410 (1901).
4 191 Il1. 516 at 523, 61 N. E. 410 at 412, quoting from Andrews v. City of Portland, 79 Me. 484, 10 A. 458, 10 Am. St. Rep. 280 (1887).
5235 Ill. 472, 85 N. E. 614 (1908).
6 People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578, 105 N. E. 1 (1914).
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with a situation which involved actual payment of the salary to a
7
de facto employee who had served during the period of removal.
For the first time, the court recognized that there existed serious
disagreement throughout the country over this question.8 Nevertheless, with a cursory reference to the "title theory" of the Luthardt
case, it decided that such payment was no defense. Illinois was thereby aligned, at least for a time, with the distinct minority of the
American jurisdictions.
That problem again came before the Supreme Court in People
ex rel. Sartison v. Schmidt,9 where it at last received the intelligent
discussion which it merited. The relator therein had been wrongfully
removed and sought reinstatement and compensation for the period
of his removal. The defense of payment to a de facto employee was
raised. The court, without regard to the holding in People-ex rel.
Blachly v. Coffin, 1 considered the question to be one of first impression in Illinois. It proceeded to a discussion of the law in other
jurisdictions as well as a learned and intelligent dissertation of the
compelling public aspects of the problem. Upholding the defense of
payment to a de facto employee, it said: "We are of the opinion
that payment to a de facto public officer of the salary of the office,
made while he is in possession, is a good defense to an action brought
by a de jure officer to recover the same salary after he has acquired
or regained possession."" The court was careful, however, to add a
necessary qualification to such holding by saying: "If the salary or
compensation has been paid in good faith . . . it cannot . . . be recovered. .... ,,i2 There should be little doubt as to the validity of that

proviso, for the sovereign ought not be protected when it acts in
bad faith. In its opinion in the Schmidt case, the court considered
all of the previous utterances on the subject, distinguished the problem from that in the Luthardt and Bullis cases, and necessarily rejected the Coffin and Brady cases, even though, with judicial courtesy,
it refrained from a direct refutation of the latter. Shortly afterward,
however, in People ex rel. Durante v. Burdett,13 it reaffirmed such
holding and expressly overruled the Coffin case.
The controversy then appeared to be well-settled, but it arose
again to confront the court in People ex rel. McDonnell v. Thompson.14 This time, the point of attack centered on the "good faith"
7

People ex rel. Blachly v. Coffin, 279 Ill. 401, 117 N. E. 85 (1917).

s See annotation to Hittell v. City of Chicago, 327 Ill. 443, 158 N. E. 683 (1927),

in 55 A. L. R. 997 for a very thorough analysis of this point.
9 281 Ill. 211, 117 N. E. 1037 (1917).
10 279 Ill. 401, 117 N. E. 85 (1917).
11 281 Ill. 211 at 215, 117 N. E. 1037 at 1038. Italics added. It is interesting to
note that the court's reference to "acquired or regained," impliedly recognizes the
essential similarity between a wrongful removal and a wrongful failure to appoint.
12 281 Ill. 211 at 217, 117 N. E. 1037 at 1039. Italics added.
1 283 Ill. 124, 118 N. E. 1009 (1918).
14 316 Iii. 11, 146 N. E. 473 (1925).
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referred to in the Schmidt case. Plaintiff therein was seeking compensation not for the entire period of his removal but for the time
which had elapsed between the entry of the order directing his reinstatement and the actual restoration to the position. The court
awarded compensation, referring to a "well-defined exception" to the
doctrine of the Schmidt case. The result was justified both in law
and in policy, but the reasoning of the court could hardly be called
compelling.
Probably because of the weakness of the reasoning in the Thompson case, the next time the question arose, as it did in Hittell v. City
of Chicago,15 the Supreme Court was obliged to consider the problem
of good faith at some length. It re-examined the statement in the
Schmidt case and gave it approval. Explanation for such view was
provided in the following words: "The exigencies of society require
efficient performance of official duties, and to secure such performance prompt payment therefor is an essential requisite. Disbursing
officers of municipalities are not clothed with judicial power to
determine whether or not a person vested with the indicia of an office
and performing the duties of such office is, in fact, a de jure officer,
where there has been no judicial determination of such fact." 6 By
that statement, the court provided not only an explanation as to what
was the good faith required of the sovereign by the Schmidt case but,
more important, why protection for acts done in good faith was
necessary. The necessity for judicial determination of the right to
office before bad faith could be said to exist was emphasized when
the court said: ". . in no case where the question was involved do
we find that it has been held by this court that proof of the good faith
of the payment to the de facto employee was a requisite element of
such defense prior to a judicial determination as to which was the
17
de jure employee."
It appears, therefore, that the present doctrine in Illinois regarding this situation is that payment of the interim salary to a de facto
employee will ordinarily constitute a good defense. If there has been
a judicial determination of the right to office, however, the municipal
employer must also show good faith as an essential element of its
defense. The question of good faith was not raised in the instant
case, but it would seem clear that, had it been raised, the court could
have held that good faith was lacking as a matter of law.' 8 It is true
that the municipal defendant argued that a decision of a lower court,
during pendency of an appeal, was not, in point of law, a judicial
determination of the right to office until the appeal had been finally
15 327 Il1.

443, 158 N. E. 683 (1927).
16 327 I1. 443 at 447, 158 N. E. 683 at 684. Italics added.
17 327 I1. 443 at 445, 158 N. E. 683 at 684. Italics added.
is Holdings from other Jurisdictions supporting such view may be found in 55
A. L. R. 997 at 1013.
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determined. To support such argument, it contended that to hold
otherwise would be to penalize the city for exercising its right to
appeal. That argument was refuted, and correctly so, when the
Appellate Court pointed out that, using the analogous situation of an
unsuccessful appeal from a money judgment followed by the imposition of interest from the date of the judgment in the lower court,
any penalty suffered was the consequence of the lack of success on
appeal. The mere pendency of an appeal from a judicial determination of a right to office cannot, therefore, be deemed sufficient to
justify a claim of good faith in refusing to appoint or restore to
appointment while the municipal employer continues to pay the
salary of the office to another.
An interesting problem is thereby posed to the officials of the
municipality, for if the appeal is unsuccessful they will have incurred
a duty to make double compensation. That problem is not insurmountable, however, for upon entry of the order for appointment or
reinstatement in the lower court, the city could comply by discharging the interim employee and offering the position to the successful
plaintiff. It might still appeal and, if the decision of the lower court
was affirmed, the plaintiff would merely continue in office. Should
the lower court's decision be reversed, the city could then remove
the plaintiff from office and reinstate the interim employee. The
latter could have no claim against the city for compensation during
the period of his removal for, by the clear-cut law of Illinois, the
municipality could use the defense of payment in good faith to a
de facto appointee. In either eventuality, therefore, the city would
suffer no penalty for exercising its right to appeal. If it should be
urged that, by abiding by the order of the lower court, the municipality had lost its right to appeal, 19 the appointment of the plaintiff
could be made on a temporary basis until the disposition of the
20
appeal.
A. BAUM
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the recent case of Snyder v. Heinrichs,' the Appellate Court of Indiana was
called upon to construe the meaning of the Indiana Small Loan Act
as it applied to the business of making small loans. 2 The litigation

ACT" SO AS TO SUBJECT LENDER TO THE PENALTIES THEREOF-In

therein arose after the borrower had defaulted on a promissory note
for $200 calling for twenty-four per cent. interest, given to a lender
19 Freeman, Judgments, 5th.Ed., Vol. II, p. 2406.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 9-16.
1- Ind. App. -, 55 N. E. (2d) 332 (1944).
2

Burns' Ann. Stat. 1933,

§§ 10465-8.

§

18-3001 to

§

18-3004; Baldwin's Ann. Stat. 1934,
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whose principal occupation was that of tavern owner and operator.
It appeared that similar loans had been made by plaintiff to the
borrower's step-son on two occasions, but the evidence disclosed theri
to be more or less isolated transactions. The borrower contended that,
as the plaintiff had not complied with the terms and conditions of the
Small Loan Law and possessed no license to loan money at more than
ordinary rates, the lender should forfeit both principal and interest.
Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of the principal sum without
interest was affirmed when the court concluded that the Small Loan
Law applied only to persons who "engage in the business" of making
loans at interest in excess of ordinary rates and that plaintiff was not
in that category. By so doing,-the court set a precedent for that state
which does little more than add to the general confusion as to what is
meant by the language of statutes, now found in a majority of states,
purporting to regulate the so-called "small loan" business.
In order to arrive at that decision, the Indiana court relied on
cases which define the words "doing business" but which are based
3
on statutes entirely irrelevant to the problem in the instant case,
4
although one case, that of Stevens v. Grossman, might be said to
have some bearing since in it a note given to a contractor for a balance
due was enforced although he was not licensed under the Small Loan
Act, despite the fact that it called for more than ordinary interest,
because the contractor was said not to be engaged in the loan business.5 If the act in question be designed solely to regulate persons
who make small cash loans as a regular business, then it should not
apply to the occasional lender.
In this state, the Illinois Supreme Court, after upholding the
constitutionality of a statute which is almost identical with the Indiana Act, 6 decided one criminal case based upon an alleged violation
thereof where it indicated that its views would accord with those of
the Indiana court in the instant case for it there said: -"The object
of the law is not to regulate the rate of interest, but ... is to regulate
the business of making loans of small sums of money to wage earners
and salaried people."' 7 The Appellate Courts of Illinois, however,
are not in agreement on the subject for that of the Fir*st District,
First Division, hasi held a single loan on an automobile, secured by
chattel mortgage, will bring the lender within the penalty provisions
a Vandalia R. Co. v. Stilwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cases 1916D 258
(1914) ; Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F. (2d) 417, 139 A. L. R. 1013 (1942).
4 100 Ind. App. 417,
5 Lockwood, Adm'r

196 N. E. 123 (1935).
v. Woods, 3 Ind. App. 258, 29 N. E. 569 (1892), was said to
require disallowance of the usurious interest but not the forfeiture ot the prin-

cipal.

. 6 Laws 1935, p. 925; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 74, § 19 et seq. The former statute,
Laws 1917, p. 553, was held constitutional in People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159, 118
N. E. 87 (1917).
7 People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159 at 174, 118 N. E. 87 at 92 (1917).
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of the act if there is a failure to secure a license,8 although the First
District, Third Division, has reached an opposite holding on a similar
Issue. 9 The debt at usurious interest must be one for money loaned,
though, for the taking of a note to cover the cost of certain automobile
repairs has been held not to be the sort of transaction or business
10
regulated by the statute.
The inference contained in the instant case that the lender must
be in the sole business of, or at least devote a substantial portion of a
varied business to, loaning money before he comes within the purview
of such statutes seems to be borne out by other cases. It has been
held, for example, that the act does not apply to persons loaning
money to laborers to be paid back on pay-day;" to jewelers loaning
money on warehouse receipts;12 to garageman being paid a single
repair bill in installments -with interest;13 to a lender securing an
isolated loan by a chattel mortgage ;14 to a person in the pawnbroking
business but making only one loan;15 to a lawyer occasionally loaning
money on notes secured by second mortgages;16 and to commercial
banks.1 7 In contrast, it has been held that the Small Loan Act does
apply to Morris Plan banks or to companies doing a similar business ;2s to loans made by an insurance agency which coerced borrowers
into the purchase of insurance ;19 to licensed security dealers who purchase wage assignments;20

to retail merchants who do likewise;21

22
and has been held to apply to a single transaction.

8 In Ranning v. Peyser, 259 Ill. App. 152 at 154 (1930), the court said: "The
statute . . . has been construed to mean that even a single forbidden transaction
makes the lender guilty of a violation of its provision."
"This
9 The court, in Turk v. Bender, 273 Ill. App. 84 at 86-8 (1933), declared:
is the one and only loan ever made by the plaintiff . . . and there is no proof that
plaintiff was in such business. We hold the statute in question has no application
here."
"The statute is
10 People v. Morse, 270 Ill. App. 207 at 210 (1933), states:
clearly applicable only to a case involving loaning money. It should not . . . include an arrangement whereby a bill for repairs may be paid In Installments."
11 Means v. State, 75 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.) 953 (1934).
12 City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 118 Ill. 632, 8 N. E. 812 (1886).
13 People v. Morse, 270 Ill. App. 207 (1933).
14 Turk v. Bender, 273 Ill. App. 84 (1933).
15 In Craddock v. Woods, 60 Ga. App. 377 at 380, 3 S. E. (2d) 924 at 926 (1939),
the court said: "Being in the loan business and making one loan . . . does not
demand the inference that plaintiff was doing business under the Small Loan
Act." See also Levison v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185, 88 P. 825, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575
(1907).
In Rice v. Garnett, 17 Ala. App. 239, 84 So. 557 (1919), the court did
indicate, however, that the evidence might be sufficient to make this a question for
the jury.
16Zirkle v. Daly, 54 F. (2d) 455 (1932).
17 The Small Loan Act has been held inapplicable to banks in City of Allentown
v. Personal Finance Co., 19 Leh. L. J. (Pa. Com. P1.) 247 (1942).
1s Whaley v. State, 176 Tenn. 170, 139 S. W. (2d) 255 (1939).
19 Commonwealth ex rel. Grauman v. Continental Co., Inc., 275 Ky. 238, 121 S. W.
(2d) 49 (1938), condemned the practice on the ground that it was a device to
obtain a rate of interest in excess of ordinary rates.
20 State ex rel. Ormes v. Tennessee Finance Co., 152 Tenn. 45, 269 S. W. 1119
(1925).
21 Costello v. Great Falls Iron Works, 59 Mont. 417, 196 P. 982 (1921) ; Koen v.
State, 162 Tenn. 573, 39 S. W. (2d) 283 (1931).
22 Rice v. Franklin Loan & Finance Co., 82 Colo. 163, 258 P. 223 (1927).
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It can be seen, then, that there is a lack of uniformity on the question although perhaps the majority of cases would free the isolated
lenider from the rather severe penalties of the Small Loan Act and
impose on him only the milder consequences of the ordinary usury
laws. Such would seem to be more in accord with the philosophy
behind such legislation, but the language thereof is unfortunate for
it poses the question as to when one ceases to be an occasional lender
so as to make conformity with the act necessary. Uncertainty in the
law of Illinois on this point remains to be solved although there is
some reason to believe, from the cited illustrations, that the courts
of this state would absolve the occasional usurious lender if his principal business was not allied to that usually associated with pawn
brokers and money lenders.
A. LUDWIG
PAYMENT-RECOVERY

OF PAYMENTS-WHETHER

MONEY PAID WITH

FULL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS AND IGNORANCE ONLY OF LEGAL RIGHTS MAY
RECOVERED IN
ABSENCE OF COMPULSION-In the recent case of
Western & Southern Life Insurance Company v. Brueggeman' the
Appellate Court of Illinois had occasion to give utterance to a sometimes overlooked rule of law when it denied recovery of money paid
under mistake. In that case, an insurance company sought to recover
an overpayment made on a life insurance policy containing a military
service exemption clause. 2 Through inadvertence, and while having
in its possession the full story of the insured's death while in military
service in time of war, the company paid the full face value of the
policy. Demand for the return of the erroneous overpayment was
refused and suit followed. Judgment in the trial court for the defendant was affirmed, the Appellate Court saying: "The general rule
seems to be that a payment made, with full knowledge of the facts
and in ignorance only of legal rights cannot be recovered back." 3
BE

It would appear at first blush, from that statement, that one who
inadvertently hands over two $100 currency notes instead of one in
payment of a debt for $100 may not sue as in general assumpsit for
money had and received to recover the overpayment. Such a rule,
however, would completely abrogate the basic doctrine of quasi-contract which, being equitable in nature, is predicated upon the theory
that defendant has received money which in equity and good conscience he ought not be permitted to retain.4 Unless, therefore, he
'323 Ill. App. 173, 55 N. E. (2d) 719 (1944).
2 The clause read:
"In the event the insured dies while in Military or Naval
Service in time of war, the liability of the company shall be limited to the amount
of the premiums paid on this policy, with Interest thereon at the rate of three per
centum per annum."
3323 Ill. App. 173 at 178, 55 N. E. (2d) 719 at 721.
4 Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760).

CHICAGO-KENT LAV REVIEW

can show a right to keep it, the money should be returned. Payment
made and received by reason of a mistake of fact of the kind 5 thus
illustrated provides clear basis in equity for the return thereof.
Confined to ,its proper limits, however, the rule so stated seems
to be well established that a voluntary known and intended payment
made to one under a claim of right, with full knowledge of all the
facts and in ignorance only of legal rights, cannot be recovered provided that there is no fraud or compulsion tantamount to duress.
Such rule appears to have been given its earliest utterance by the
eminent Lord Ellenborough in a case very similar in facts and principles to the instant case, 6 and has since been affirmed both in England 7 and the majority of the American courts.8 Illinois has followed
that majority without a single case of exception.f
The instant case, however, appears to go farther in its application
of the doctrine for the court held that the insurance company had
waived its rights to assert the military exemption clause by the mere
act of mailing a check for the full face value of the policy to the
beneficiary. It cannot be said that the company clearly intended. a
waiver for its attention was seemingly concentrated on a suicide
clause contained in the same policy and the military exemption clause
was overlooked. But the modern trend would seem to be that courts
will find a waiver or estoppel against an insurance company whenever
5 Pool v. Allen, 29 N. C. 120 (1846).
An underwriter there
16Bilby v. Lumley, 2 East 469, 102 Eng. Rep. 448 (1802).
sued to recover payment on the ground, that defendant had failed to disclose to
plaintiff a material letter relating to the transaction. Defendant proved that
plaintiff had possession of the letter before the policy was adjusted and the money
paid. The contents of the letter disclosed a good defence on the policy. Recovery
was'denied when the court found a voluntary payment present even though plaintiff acted in ignorance of his legal rights.
7 Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143, 128 Eng. Rep. 641 (1813); Currie v. Goold,
2 Madd. 163, 56 Eng. Rep. 295 (1817) ; Martin v. Morgan, 1 Brod. & Bing. 289, 129
Eng. Rep. 734 (1819) ; The East India Co. v. Tritton, 3 B. & C. 280, 107 Eng. Rep.
738 (1824) ; Bramston. v. Robins, 4 Bing. 11, 130 Eng. Rep. 671 (1826) ; Stevens v.
Lynch, 12 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 16 (1810). See also 22 Eng. & Emp. Dig. 161;
35 ibid 158-9.
8 See, for example, Utermehle v. Normant, 197 U. S. 40, 25 S. Ct. 291, 49 L. Ed.
655 (1905); Lamborn v. Dickinson County Com'rs, 97 U. S. 181, 24 L. Ed. 926
(1878) ; Detroit Edison Co. v. Wyatt Coal Co., 293 F. 489 (1923) ; Taylor, Jr., &
Sons v. First Nat. Bank, 212 F. 898 (1914) ; Kundsen-Ferguson F. Co. v. Chicago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 149 F. 973 (1906); Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265
(1861) ; Lester v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 29 Md. 415 (1868);
Deveraux v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 98 N. C. 6, 3 S. E. 639 (1887) ; Shuck v.
Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 63 S. C. 134, 41 S. E. 28 (1902); Mayor &c of
Richmond v. Judah, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 305 (1834) ; Haigh v. U. S. B. L. & L. Association, 19 W. Va. 792 (1882).
9Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 85 N. E. 200 (1908)
People v. Foster, 133 Ill. 496, 23 N. E. 615 (1890) ; Union Building Ass'n v. City
of Chicago, 61 Ill. 439 (1871); City of Chicago v. Stuart, 53 Ill. 83 (1869) ; Stover
v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 213 (1867) ; Bryan v. Pilgrim Nat. Life Ins. Co., 294 Ill. App.
356, 13 N. I. (2d) 850 (1938); Sando v. Smith, 237 Ill. App.. 570 (1925).
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it has done anything inconsistent with the provisions of the policy
which have been inserted therein for its benefit.' 0
There may be some justification for such a view when an insurance company waives a defence which it might have asserted to a
suit by the beneficiary as, for example, because of his failure to file
proofs of loss within the specified time, but it is quite another matter
to hold it to a waiver which results in the creation of a liability in
the first instance. Waiver of a defence presupposes the existence of
a liability which might have been avoided, so that payment under
such circumstances might be said to involve no inequity on the part
of the recipient calling for its return. A waiver of the type claimecl
in the instant case, however, creates a liability which was never there
so long as the provision in question remained to confine the risk.
Receipt of payment when no debt is due or owing would certainly
seem to justify proceedings for the recovery of the amounts so paid.
The court met this problem by adding to the rule aforementioned the
additional words:

".

.

. and proof that the one making the payment

was, in fact, under no obligation to pay, and the other had no right
to receive the payment, is of no consequence."'" By so doing, it
appears to have extended the rule for it previously had been confined
so
as to require that the recipient of the payment must have had some
claim
of right thereto, however colorable, and the payor must
have
2
been under some obligation to pay.'
Opposition to such holding may be found, but it represents a
distinctly minority view and turns upon the fact that the voluntary
payment must have been made with such full and actual knowledge
as would support the idea of either a conscious waiver or else a gift
of the amount of the overpayment. Leading exponent of that view is
the Alabama case of Franklin Life Insurance Company v. Ward"
wherein the court said:

".

.

. money voluntarily paid with full knowl-

edge of the facts cannot be recovered, but having the means of ascertaining the real facts is not tantamount to actual knowledge of such
L0Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Dowdall, 159 Ill. 179, 42 N. E. 606 (1895) ; Manufacturers' & Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v. 'Armstrong, 145 Ill. 469, 34 N. E. 553
(1893); Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, 129 Ill. 599, 22 N. E. 489 (1889):
Beddow v. Hicks, 303 I1. App. 247, 25 N. E. (2d) 93 (1940); Eagleton v, Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 193 Ill. App. 306, abst. opin. (1915) ; Cox v. The American
Ins. Co., 184 Ill. App. 419 (1913).
11 323 Ill. App. 173 at 178, 55 N. E. (2d) 719 at 721.
12 Compare the instant case with that of Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone
Co., 234 Ill. 535, 85 N. E. 200 (1908), where the quoted language was used in con-

nection with the plaintiff's contention that it was under a business compulsion,
hence the payment was not a voluntary one. • See also City of Chicago v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 218 Ill. 40, 75 N. E. 803 (1905) ; Gannaway v. Barricklow, 203 Ill. 410, 67 N. E. 825 (1903) ; Yates v. Royal Ins. Co., 200 Ill. 202, 65 N. E.
726 (1902) ; Pemberton v. Williams, 87 Ill. 15 (1877) ; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. C., V. &
W. Coal Co., 79 Ill. 121 (1875) ; Elston v. City of Chicago, 40 Ill. 514 (1866).
1 237 Ala. 474, 187 So. 462 (1939).
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facts."'1 4 Similar holdings may be found in other cases arising in the
same state 15 or in Michigan 16 but there is a notable absence of decisions in other jurisdictions. That minority view, however, has an
appeal to the sense of fairness and equity.
In view of the fact that the contract of insurance in the instant
case called for payment of the face amount upon the death of the
insured but expressly limited liability in the event the insured died
while in military service to the return of premiums paid with interest,
the maximum legal and equitable obligation of the company under the
circumstances was to refund the premiums paid. In equity and good
conscience, therefore, the mistaken payment of any excess over that
figure, in the absence of actual and conscious knowledge that an overpayment was being given, ought fairly to be recoverable. To impose
a penalty of the magnitude herein involved for an honest mistake,
whether attributable to an insurance company or a human being,
seems far too harsh to comport with basic principles underlying the
remedy of quasi-contract.
S. L. EHRLICH
WILLS -

RIGHTS

AND

LIABILITIES

OF

DEVISEES

AND

LEGATEES

-

WHETHER THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT OF A SPECIFIC DEVISE PURSUANT TO
COURT ORDER FOR THE BENEFIT OF AN INCOMPETENT TESTATOR WORKS AN

ADEMPTION THEREOF-The courts of this country are not in accord

upon the question whether the sale of the subject of a specific devise
by a court order for the benefit of an incompetent testator works an
ademption thereof. The Supreme Court of Illinois had occasion, in
the recent case of Lewis v. Hill,' to examine into that problem for
the first time. The facts therein showed that the testatrix, by her
last will and testament, devised certain real estate to the plaintiff. A
few years after making such will, the testatrix was adjudged to be
incompetent and defendant was appointed conservator of her estate.
The conservator filed a petition to sell the real estate in question on
the ground that the sale was necessary to provide money for his
ward's care. Sale was ordered and the property was sold in due

course.
14

Testatrix died shortly thereafter and her will was admitted

237 Ala. 474 at 481, 187 So. 462 at 467.

15 Roney v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co.; 225 Ala. 367, 14-3 So. 517 (1932)
Beasley v. Beasley, 206 Ala. 480, 90 So. 347 (1921); Traweek v. Hagler, 199 Ala.
664, 75 So. 152 (1917) ; Ledger Pub. Co. v. Miller, 170 Ala. 437, 54 So. 52 (1910) ;
Merrill v. Brantley, 133 Ala. 537, 31 So. 847 (1902) ; Hemphill v. Moody, 64 Ala.
468 (1879); Young & Son v. Lehman, Durr & Co., 63 Ala. 519 (1878); Town
Council of Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400 (1859) ; Rutherford v. Mclvor, 21 Ala.
750 (1852).
16 Truax v. Bliss, 139 Mich. 153, 102 N. W. 635 (1905) ; Pingree v. Mutual Gas
Co., 107 Mich. 156, 65 N. W. 6 (1895); Lane v. Pere Marquette Boom Co., 62
Mich. 63, 28 N. W. 786 (1886).
1387 Ill. 542, 56 N. E. (2d) 619 (1944), affirming 322 Ill. App. 68, 53 N. E. (2d)
736 (1944). See also another aspect of the same case in 317 Ill. App. 531, 47 N. E.
(2d) 127 (1943).
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to probate, defendant being appointed executor thereof. At that
time, defendant reported a balance of money on hand.
Plaintiff,
devisee under the will, then brought suit in the circuit court to impress a trust on such fund to the extent of the sale price on the theory
that the sale of the real estate did not operate to adeem the specific
devise of that property to her and prayed that defendant be ordered
to pay plaintiff such sum in the due course of administration. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, among
other things, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction 2 and that the devise
to plaintiff was adeem'ed. After denial of such motion, the court
found in plaintiff's favor. Such decree was affirmed both in the Appellate Court and by the Supreme Court on certificate of importance.
In arriving at the conclusion that an ademption did not take place,
the Illinois Supreme Court had to engraft an exception on the general
rule prevailing in this state to the effect that where a specific article
of property is bequeathed or devised and such article is lost, destroyed, or disposed of by the testator during his lifetime, so that it
is not in existence or does not belong to him at his death, there is an
ademption or extinguishment of such bequest or devise.3 While the
court recognized that the real estate of the testatrix in the possession
of her conservator constituted assets to be used, if necessary, for her
support and for the payment of her debts; yet, if the conversion of
the real estate into personalty was made for the sole purpose of hersupport and benefit, the fund produced by the sale, or any unexpended
balance thereof, could not be regarded as personalty for the benefit
4
of residuary legatees.
The rule'seems to have prevailed in some of the old English cases
that whether an ademption took place or not was a question which
turned on the intention to be imputed to the testator, the courts
2 The Appellate Court held that action in the circuit court was proper for the
reason that, by tracing the proceeds of the sale into the hands of the executor,
the plaintiff's attempt to impress the fund with a trust brought the controversy
within the general equitable jurisdiction of that court: 317 Inl. App. 531 at 533,
47 N. D. (2d) 127 at 128.
3 Lenzen v. Miller, 378 Ill. 170, 37 N. E. (2d)
833 (1941) ; Tanton v. Keller, 167
Ill. 129, 47 N. E. 376 (1897).
4 The court said: "The governing principle in the management of property belonging to a person of unsound mind is the furtherance of his interest. Therefore,
his property may be converted from realty Into personalty whenever it appears to
be for his interest to do so, regardless of the contingent interests of the real and
personal representatives or the interests of those who may have the eventual
rights of succession." See 387 Ill. 542 at 546, 56 N. E. (2d) 619 at 621. But the
court likened the problem to that which arises when an executor sells real estate
of the testator for the payment of his debts. In such case, the conversion of
realty into personalty is completed to all intents and purposes only to the extent
to which the purchase money is required for the particular objects for which
the sale takes place and the excess, though in the form of money, remains Impressed with the character of real estate for the purpose of determining who is
entitled to receive it: Smith v. Smith, 174 Ill. 52, 50 N. E. 1083, 43 L. R. A. 403

(1898).
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thereby adopting the animus adimendi of the civil law. 5 Since Lord
Thurlow's decision in Ashburner v. MacGuire,6 however, the English
courts have generally held that the only test to apply in cases involving ademption by extinction is: (1) was the legacy specific, and (2)
was the subject of the legacy in existence at the testator's death and
did he then own it.
If the legacy was specific and if the subject
thereof was sold or destroyed before the testator died, or not then
owned by him, it was adeemed and the legatee lost the legacy, in
whole or in part.7 Much the same view has been held by some of the
American courts, at least in cases which did not involve the subsequent mental derangement of the testator s
On the precise point here concerned, some of the English cases
have held that, aside from the effect of any controlling statute, an
ademption of a specific legacy will occur where, after the insanity of
the testator occurs, the thing bequeathed or devised is converted by
his conservator having legal authority to represent him without regard
to whether or not the proceeds are preserved as such until the testator's death. 9 No ademption occurs, however, when the conversion
has been made by one without authority, particularly if the proceeds
have been set apart and preserved up to the time of the testator's
death. 10 Three other English cases have declared that an actual intention on the part of the testator is an essential element of ademption, especially where the subject of the bequest has been sold, invested, or changed in some manner by a party who purports to represent the testator in such transactions but is acting without his authority.1 ' To eliminate hardships which had arisen by reason of the
application of the general doctrine to cases involving incompetent
testators, a statute known as the Lunacy Act of 1890 was enacted in
England which purports to treat the fund created by the conversion,
or any balance thereof, in the same fashion as if conversion had never
taken place.' 2 In one case arising since that statute, however, the
5 See Justinian, Inst., lib. II, tit. xx, § 12.
6 2 Bro. C. C. 108, 29 Eng. Rep. 62 (1786).

See Page, Ademption by Extinction: Its Practical Effects, 1943 Wis. L. Rev. 11.
8 Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, 82 A. 988 (1911) ; Unitarian Society v. Tufts,
151 Mass. 76, 23 N. E. 1006 (1890); Hosea v. Skinner, 67 N. Y. S. 527, 32 Misc.
653 (1900).
9 In re Freer, 22 L. R. Ch. Div. 622 (1882) ; Jones V. Green, 5 L. R. Eq. 555
(1868).
lo In re Larking, 37 L. R. Ch. Div. 310 (1887).
11 Jenkins v. Jones, 2 L. R. Eq. 323 (1866) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Hare 475, 68
Eng. Rep. 1014 (1853) ; Basan v. Brandon, 8 Sim. 171, 59 Eng. Rep. 68 (1836).
12 53 and 54 Vict., c. 5, § 123(1). It provides: "The lunatic, his heirs, executors, administrators, next of kin, devisees, legatees, and assigns, shall have the
7

same interest in any moneys arising from any sale, mortgage, or other disposition,

under the powers of this act which may not have been applied under such powers
as he or they would have hfd in the property the subject of the sale, mortgage, or
disposition, if no sale, mortgage, or disposition, had been made, and the surplus
moneys shall be of the same nature as the property sold, mortgaged, or disposed
of."
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same was held insufficient to protect the rights of a legatee to whom
a bank deposit had been bequeathed when, under order of court, such
deposit was paid into court and invested pursuant to its direction
because it was said that the operation of that statute had to be confined to cash balances on hand at time of death and could not apply
3
to other kinds of property.'
In this country, Pennsylvania applied the objective test of the
English courts quite early 14 and in 1853 extended its application to a
case concerning an incompetent testator by expressly denying that
ademption was a question of intention of the testator, either explicit
or implied. 15 In New York, on the other hand, it had at one time been
held that the intention theory could be invoked in cases involving
incompetent testators, and, by reason of such incompetency, no ademption could arise. 16 The highest court of that state, in 1931, in a case
concerning an incompetent testator, repudiated that view and decided
that a specific legacy was adeemed since the lack of intent on the part
of the testator was immaterial.' 7 After noting that the bequest therein
of certain preferred stock was a specific legacy and, as such stock was
not in existence at the time the will took effect, there had been an
ademption or withdrawal of the gift, the court said: "In the absence
of statute, there is no power in the courts to change a specific into a
general legacy or turn over the balance of the proceeds derived from
the sale of the specific property to the legatee in place of the particular thing intended to be given ... The rule as it existed at common law, and still exists, admits of no such exception."' s
13 In

re Walker, 2 Ch. Div. (1921) 63.
14 In Blackstone v. Blackstone, 43 Pa. (3 Watts) 335 (1834), a bequest of bank
stock was made in a will but, subsequent to execution, the same was exchanged for
a bond with the declared intention of keeping the bond for the legatee in lieu of
the stock. Ademption was found for reasons paramount to all considerations of
intention, and the legacy having ceased to exist in specie, no matter how its extinction was caused, neither the bond taken as a substitute for it, nor its value,
could be demanded from the executor.
15 See Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. St. (9 Harris) 301 (1853). The court, at p. 305,
said: ". . . if a thing bequeathed in a will by such a description as to distinguish
it from all other things be disposed of, so that it does not remain at the death of
the testator, or if it be so changed that it cannot be called the same thing, the
bequest is gone. If such legacy be of a debt, payment necessarily makes an end of
it. The legatee is entitled to the very thing bequeathed if it be possible for the
executor to give it to him; but if not, he cannot have money in place of it. This
results from an inflexible rule of law applied to the mere fact that the thing bequeathed does not exist, and it is not founded on any presumed intention of the
testator."
16 Snedecker v. Ellis, 241 N. Y. S. 563, 136 Misc. 607 (1930) ; In re Garlick's
Estate. 161 N. Y. S. 1113, 96 Misc. 653 (1916) ; In re Carter, 130 N. Y. S. 201, 71
Misc. 406 (1911).
17 See In re Ireland's Estate, 257 N. Y. 155, 177 N. E. 405
(1931), noted in 1
Brooklyn L. Rev. 127, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 9 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 506, and 41 Yale
L. J. 101. The opinion of the lower court, 231 App. Div. 288, 247 N Y. S. 267
(1931), was commented upon favorably in 16 Corn. L. Q. 623, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
990, and 17 Va. L. Rev. 584.
18 257 N. Y. 155 at 158, 177 N. E. 405 at 406.
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Cases arising in the states of New Jersey, 19 Missouri,2 0 New
Hampshire, 21 and Michigan, 2 2 as well as in the federal court sitting in
this state, 23 however, have held that no ademption occurs in cases of
this type because of the necessity of an intention to adeem which
would be absent in the case of an incompetent person. The unfairness
to a legatee caused by applying the objective test is clearly revealed
in those cases where the property has been converted or changed in
character by paramount law without any act on the part of the testator. In one such case, 24 the devised realty was taken by an exercise
of the power of eminent domain, yet it was held that the devise had
been adeemed. It was said that such holding was justified because
the testator could have changed his will after the condemnation of the
particular parcel of property. Such argument could not apply to
cases wherein the testator has become incompetent since making the
original devise for he would, legally, be unable to make a new will.
Although the conservator should have the right to make changes
in investments, and even to sell property to secure ample funds for the
care of his ward, yet, if the general doctrines of ademption are allowed
to prevail, he could favor one legatee over another by choosing to dispose of a particular parcel of property instead of, some other asset.
Justice would seem to demand, as was decided in the instant case,
that an exception to the theory of ademption should be allowed.

H. H.

FLENTYE

19 In re Estate of Cooper, 95 N. J. Eq. 210, 123 A. 45 (1923), noted in 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 1141.
20 Buder v. Stocke, 343 Mo. 506, 121 S. W. (2d) 852 (1938) ; Lamkin v. Kaiser,
256 S. W. (Mo. App.) 558 (1923), noted in 24 Col. L. Rev. 405; National Board v.
Fry, 293 Mo. 399, 239 S. W. 519 (1922).
21 Morse v. Converse, 80 N. Ramp. 24, 113 A. 214 (1921).
22

In

23
24

Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 F. 896 (1910).
Ametrano v. Downs, 170 N. Y. 388, 63 N. E. 340 (1902).

re Barnes' Estate, 162 Mich. 79, 127 N. W. 37 (1910).
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Pp. xxviii, 486, with bibliography.

QUESTIONED DOCUMENT PROBLEMS.

A well-equipped law library is sure to contain two earlier works
by Albert S. Osborn, for his "Questioned Documents," first published
in 1910, and his "The Problem of Proof," issued in 1927, have become
essential handbooks on certain phases of evidence law. This companion work, not intended to take the place of either of the others,
presents definite suggestions to the lawyer and the document examiner
who may have occasion to face an issue as to the validity of a doubtful
or even spurious document.
Much of the book is a reprinting of materials that have appeared
elsewhere or represents the reduction to print of papers read at scientific meetings. Unfortunately, repetition is likely to creep into a
work prepared in such fashion unless subjected to intensive editorial
treatment, so the reader is apt to be impressed with the feeling that
the material has been poorly integrated. One might almost remark
that there is as much internal evidence throughout the book to prove
the authorship of the several parts as would convince a handwriting
expert that a given specimen was genuine from the constant reiteration
of peculiar characteristics in penmanship.
If faults of this kind are not permitted to detract from the message
conveyed, however, there is much in this book to be read with profit.
No small feature is the challenge provided the reader to check his own
skill in detecting similarities and dissimilarities in handwriting
samples. Certainly, the suggestions as to testing, photographing, and
protecting the questioned document are of supreme value as are also
the outlines of study to be pursued by one who might plan a career as
a questioned document examiner. A critical bibliography of recent
publications on the subject should be more than helpful, while the
references to decided cases involving problems of proof of this specialized topic are especially valuable.
The author has a tendency, though, to depart from his main
thesis-if that thesis can be gathered from the title given this bookto tilt at more than one windmill that has stood alongside his path in
a long lifetime of experience as a lay witness. It may be captious
criticism to say that such asides have little bearing on the fundamental problems covered, for the discussion lets welcome fresh air
blow into more than one musty corner of the law. His suggestionj
for the improvement of the administration of justice, for the development of a system of ethics among professional witnesses, and even for
enhancement of the law school curriculum are worthy of notice even
though they may be said to be out of place. The advice he extends
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to the young lawyer discloses a sympathetic understanding of the
needs of the novitiate. Digressions by one so obviously sincere can
well be condoned.
W. F. ZACHARIAS
Warren A. Seavey. St. Paul, Minnesota: American
Casebook Series, West Publishing Company, 1945. Pp. xxix, 676.

CASES ON AGENCY.

This publication comes to fill the need for modern cases in the
casebooks on the law of Agency. The author feels, from his many
years of teaching experience, that students crave for recent cases, and
he ministers to their desire. Indeed, from the very first chapter the
student might possibly get the impression that all law on the subject
had its origin in the Restatement. Yet he will find in the first two
chapters alone, in concentrated form, alive and replete with the most
modern fact situations, a rather complete survey of Agency law including references to agency for two principals and borrowed servant
problems.
Older members of the teaching profession will be startled by the
absence of footnotes and the scarcity of additional citations. References to the Restatement and to articles by the author and by Professor Wambaugh are not lacking, but footnoted compilations are
omitted. Most will agree, though, that the average law student of
today feels it below his dignity to read footnotes or to look up citations. He will never miss them, whereas both the publisher and the
war effort will benefit from the resultant saving of paper.
. Except for simplification, and except for the absence of discussion over weight of authority and minority holdings or the omission
of historical consideration of the evolution of the law, the book is
thoroughly modern in its arrangement of cases. Typical factual situations are grouped together. While cases involving negotiable instruments remain interspersed throughout the book, the systematic omission of most workmen's compensation and labor law cases will, no
doubt, be approved by all.
It has been sometimes thought an art to present a conclusion first
and, having thus aroused curiosity, to devote the rest of a given work
to the exposition of that conclusion. The instructor who prefers to
conform to traditional methods may well begin at Chapter Three,
using the beginning of the book for review purposes. The modernminded innovator, however, will make full use of this artistic method
of exposition to develop the interest of his class in the subject.
G.

MASCHINOT

BOOK REVIEWS

Proceedings, Institute on Money and the Law,
1945, New York: New York University School of Law, 1945. Paper,
pp. viii, 159.
A volume of addresses delivered at a technical institute can make
dry reading. In direct contrast, the fifteen papers reported in this
volume, presented at a joint conference on the economic, political and
legal issues raised by the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks proposals, possess a high degree of interest not only because of their
timeliness but also because they represent a scholarly appraisal by
experts of matters of grave concern.
It would not be expected that fifteen eminent men in fields so
generally as wide apart as economics and law could come to substantially similar conclusions on proposals for international co-operation
like these, for such plans have been said to mean "all things to all
men." It is a fact, though, that each one of the contributors reasons
toward the result that much will need to be done before plans of this
type can be made into effective agencies for peace. No one of these
experts decries the proposals as utterly unsound, either in law or
economics, but each advances the points of criticism he considers
important. The result is that no less than fifteen different weaknesses
are disclosed in the planned structure. If these defects are not corrected, the whole idea would be likely to collapse before the impact
of reality thereby jeopardizing human faith in the ideal of international unity. In fact, suggestions emanating from the Bretton
Woods conference would, in the opinion of some of these experts,
be more likely to produce monetary inflation than to control it.
The criticism is not all destructive, however, for excellent suggestions for revision are made. In view of the fact that the Bretton
Woods and Dumbarton Oaks proposals have not been submitted on
the "take it or leave it" basis that accompanied the recommendation
for American participation in the League of Nations, it is to be hoped
that at least some of these recommendations will be given consideration. One thing is certain, this publication provides excellent ammunition for anyone who, wishes to debate the wisdom of the more recent
of the new New Deal plans for world betterment.
MONEY AND THE LAW.

W. F.

ZACHARIAS

ACTION:
1945 Edition. Edited by
Charles S. Rhyne. Washington, D. C.: National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, 1945. P. 500.
Another valuable and interesting volume has been added to the
excellent series of publications produced by the National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers. Arranged somewhat on the plan of the
annual reports of the American Bar Association, these volumes contain a series of reports and monographs on widely varied aspects of
municipal law, all keyed to the tempo of the times.
MUNICIPALITIES AND THE LAW IN
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The changing emphasis from war to post-war problems is illustrated by discussions of housing and slum clearance projects as a
source of peacetime employment, and of the difficulties which may
arise in civil service over the return of former municipal employees.
Revenue problems would still seem to be a matter of municipal concern, judging from the amount of space allotted to reports on municipal revenue from Federally-owned or controlled property, and the collection of delinquent taxes. In that regard, an extended discussion
of a recent Missouri statute should make enlightening reading to the
public officials of this state particularly as it provides for a land trust
under which delinquent property can be acquired for public use or
held as a public land reserve. A retrospective view of civil liberties
in wartime indicates that the story of the handbill ordinances has not
yet been fully unfolded. Opposition to any increase in liability for
torts committed in the exercise of municipal functions is also displayed.
The editor deserves congratulation for being able to obtain so
substantial an- amount of readable material from so many busy contributors. He might, though, consider the advisability of numbering
his volumes if it is intended that the series should continue for there
is a tendency to assume that the latest publication is designed to supplant former editions.
W.

F.

ZACHARIAS

